本論文以伍德沃的起因操作理論作為主要的研究內容。伍德沃企圖藉由重新定義操作這個概念來挽救傳統操作理論的頹勢，並應用這套修正後的操作理論來捕捉起因關係的意涵。不過，持另一種討論起因關係之進路的機制論者卻主張說，由於伍德沃所提出的操作概念陳義過高，且涉及了逆實條件句的使用，而逆實條件句的真值皆僅是空泛地為真而已；因此，奠基在此概念之上的操作理論也就不足採信。面對這樣的批評，伍德沃逐一回應了機制論者的挑戰，並且進一步釐清與重申自己的立場。賽洛斯試圖在這樣的基礎之上將逆實依存關係進路與機制進路進行整合，並提出他自己的一套說法。

在第一章中，筆者將勾勒出整篇論文的基本架構。而在第二章中，我們論述傳統操作理論的源流與發展，並詳細介紹伍德沃的起因理論。接著，我們在第三章中討論機制論者如何針對伍德沃所提出的概念進行批評，並於第四章時討論伍德沃本人所作出的回應。最後，在第五章時，我們將說明賽洛斯如何指出這兩個進路自身的困難，與其如何從這些困難之中分析出整合兩者的可行策略；然而，筆者認為這個整合策略未必會受到伍德沃本人的認可，因為賽洛斯用以進行整合的核心概念工具—亦即賽洛斯的定律觀點—與伍德沃。據此，筆者試圖透過為機制這個概念提出一個伍德沃式的說明，以提供一個與伍德沃理論較為相容的整合方式。而本文的結論是：伍德沃的理論不僅能跳脫出傳統操作理論的困境，而且在併入伍德沃式的機制概念之後，又能夠回應來自於理論外部的批評；因而，我們相信，伍德沃的起因操作理論會是討論起因關係時的一個可行的立場。

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