CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. MOTIVATION 1 1.2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 2 1.3. RELATED WORK 3 1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 5 CHAPTER 2 PRELIMINARIES 7 2.1. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY 7 Games in normal form 7 Payoff value 7 The dominant strategy 7 The dominated strategy 8 The Nash equilibrium 8 The Pareto-efficient 8 Pareto-dominant 9 The Strong Nash equilibrium 9 The Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium 9 2.2. SCENARIOS OF COLLUSION AND DECEPTION IN N-PERSON NEGOTIATION GAMES 10 Scenarios of Deception in 2-person Negotiation Games 10 Scenarios of Coalition-proof 15 CHAPTER 3 DESIGN OF TTP-MEDIATED N-PERSON NEGOTIATION GAMES 16 3.1. FORMAL MODEL OF NEGOTIATION GAME 16 3.1.1. The Trusted Third Party Mediated Game 16 3.1.2. The Negotiation Mechanism 17 The Trusted Third Party 18 The Communication Actions 19 The Coalition Agents 20 The Negotiation Protocol 21 3.2. THE TTP N-PERSON NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES 22 3.2.1. Procedures and Sub-procedures in the General Negotiation 23 The General Negotiation Procedure 23 Sub-procedures of the General Negotiation Procedure 23 3.2.2. The Multi-round Sealed-bid Auction 27 Auction Rules 28 The Multi-round Sealed-bid Auction Procedure 32 CHAPTER 4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 34 4.1. DERIVATION OF COMPENSATION IN MULTI-ROUND SEALED-BID AUCTION 34 Derivation of compensation based on AlgorithmⅠ 35 Derivation of compensation based on AlgorithmⅡ 36 4.2. AGENT BIDDING POLICIES 38 4.3. THEOREMS 40 4.3.1. Escape from the Prisoner's Dilemma 41 4.3.2. Existence of Nash and Pareto-efficient Equilibrium 41 4.3.3. No-Fear-of-Deviation (NFD) Equilibrium 41 4.3.4. Convergence of the negotiation procedure 41 4.4. DECEPTION ISSUES 42 Six Possible Bidding Histories 43 Deception in the Auction Mechanism with Algorithm Ⅰ 47 Deception in the Auction Mechanism with Algorithm Ⅱ 50 4.5. COLLUSION ISSUES 53 4.5.1. Coalitional Stability 54 4.5.2. Not Collusion-Proof 54 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 55 5.1. FUTURE WORK 56 APPENDIX A NOTATIONS 58 A 58 C 58 D 59 F 59 G 59 I 60 K 60 M 61 N 61 S 61 T 62 V 62 APPENDIX B PROOFS OF LEMMAS 63 Proof of Lemma 1 63 Proof of Lemma 2 64 Proof of Lemma 3 65 Proof of Lemma 4 68 Proof of Lemma 5 71 Proof of Lemma 6 74 Proof of Lemma 7 80 Proof of Lemma 8 85 Proof of Lemma 9 89 Proof of Lemma 10 95 Proof of Lemma 11 104 Proof of Lemma 12 111 Proof of Lemma 13 114 Proof of Lemma 14 117 Proof of Lemma 15 122 Proof of Lemma 16 128 Proof of Lemma 17 133 Proof of Lemma 18 140 Proof of Lemma 19 145 Proof of Lemma 20 149 Proof of Lemma 21 156 Proof of Lemma 22 169 Proof of Lemma 23 177 Proof of Lemma 24 180 APPENDIX C PROOFS OF THEOREMS 182 Proof of Theorem 1 182 Proof of Theorem 2 182 Proof of Theorem 3 183 Proof of Theorem 4 183 Proof of Theorem 5 183 Proof of Theorem 6 183 Proof of Theorem 7 183 Proof of Theorem 8 183 BIBLIOGRAPHY 184rf [1 ] A. K. Dixit and B. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, W.W. 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