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研究生: 吳佩諮
Pei-Tzu Wu
論文名稱: 以賽局理論探討網路定價模式
Game Theory Approach for Internet Pricing Model
指導教授: 溫于平
Ue-Pyng Wen
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 工學院 - 工業工程與工程管理學系
Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
論文出版年: 2005
畢業學年度: 93
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 35
中文關鍵詞: 網路定價服務品質領導者-跟隨者賽局具有優先權的網路
外文關鍵詞: Internet pricing, quality of service, the leader-follower game, priority network
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  • 網路使用者的數目以驚人速度在成長,所以網路壅塞是無法避免的。然而,網路的頻寬和使用者的數目是兩個影響網路服務品質的因素。此論文的目的是要設計一個定價機制去解決更急迫網路連線的需求。因此,我們提出網路具有優先權的定價模式去達到使網路服務提供者獲利最大和網路資源使用更有效率,而在我們的模式中我們是選用反應時間當作服務品質的標準。
    在本論文中,定價模式的基本架構是提供顧客網路連線服務的網路服務提供者,而且我們利用領導者-跟隨者(史塔克伯格)的賽局去建構一個定價模式,在此賽局中,網路服務提供者是領導者,而網路使用者是跟隨者,然而,我們可以發現在網路服務提供者和使用者之間可以找到一個納許的均衡解,如果沒有透過合作,他們均無法離開此均衡解去獲得更佳的利益。另外,我們也介紹一個例去討論有二個網路服務提供者之間競爭的情形,但是,納許的均衡解有可能存在也有可能不存在。最後,我們以一些數據的例子去呈現具有優先權的網路可以改善網路的有效性並且可以增加網路服務提供者的利潤。


    The numbers of Internet users continue to grow at astonishing rate so the network congestion is inevitable. However, the bandwidth and the number of users are two factors affecting the Internet quality of service (QoS). The objective of this thesis is to design the pricing mechanism in order to solve the more urgent demands of accessing the Internet. Hence, we propose the pricing model with priority discipline to achieve the maximal benefit and use network resource more efficiently. Here, the response time is chosen as QoS in our pricing model.
    In this thesis, the basic framework of pricing model is the local Internet Service Provider (ISP) that provides the Internet Access Service to the customers. The pricing model is based on the leader-follower game, i.e., Stackelberg Game, where the ISP is the leader and the user is the follower. Consequently, we can find a Nash equilibrium point from which the ISP and the users would not move out without the cooperation. In addition, we also illustrate a special case to discuss the competition between two ISPs. But the Nash equilibrium point may or may not exist. Finally, we demonstrate some numerical examples to show that the priority discipline can improve the efficiency of Internet and increase the ISP’s profit.

    CONTENT Abstract…………………………………………………………………...i LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………...iv LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………..v 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………1 1.1 Background………………………………………………………………..………1 1.2 Motivation…………………………………………………………..……………..2 1.3 Research Framework………………………………………………………………3 2. Literature Review……………………………………………………...5 2.1 Pricing Mechanisms……………………………………………………………….5 □2.1.1 Flat-rate Pricing……………………………………………………………...5 □2.1.2 Priority Pricing………………………………………………………………7 □2.1.3 Paris Metro Pricing…………………………………………………………..7 □2.1.4 Smart Market Pricing………………………………………………………..8 □2.1.5 Expected Capacity Allocation……………………………………………...10 2.2 Concepts of Stackelberg Game…………………………………………………...11 □2.2.1 Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Game………………………………….11 □2.2.2 Stackelberg Game ………………………………………………………….11 2.3 Expected Gain for Requests of the Internet User………………………………...13 3. Model Construction…………………………………………………..15 3.1 Problem Statement……………………………………………………………….15 □3.1.1 Framework of System……………………………………………………...15 □3.1.2 Difference between the Users………………………………………………16 3.2 Model Framework………………………………………………………………..17 □3.2.1 Game Theoretical Framework……………………………………………...17 □3.2.2 Priority Discipline…...……………………………………………………..18 □3.2.3 The Pricing Model………………………………………………………….22 4. Numerical analysis…………………………………………………...25 4.1 Numerical Examples…………………………KK………………K…………..25 4.2 The Characteristic of the Users…………………………………………………..27 4.3 The Discussion of Different Parameters and ………………………..28 4.4 The Difference between FCFS and Priority Disciplines…………………………30 5. Conclusions…………………………………………………………..32 Reference………………………………………………………………..34

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