隨著半導體供應鏈的全球化，它帶來了越來越大的安全和隱私風險。其中兩個主要問題中，大多數是通過反向工程對電路的惡意修改以及IP被盜用。因此，邏輯混淆是可以阻止惡意的製造廠進行逆向工程的研究目標。
即使我們向攻擊者洩漏出了部分的設計，邏輯混淆是阻止這類攻擊的其中的一種方法。目前邏輯混淆技術是最流行的積體電路中保護技術之一。在本篇論文的設計概念是在記憶體內增加一些電路，使我們的記憶體電路具有邏輯混淆性。假如使用錯誤的密鑰來操作此電路，將會得到錯誤的資訊。因此，即使攻擊者透過逆向工程提取電路來竊取具有價值資訊的設計，我們也可以運用邏輯混淆來保護信息。
本篇論文提出一種用磁性記憶體為基礎之預解碼器邏輯混淆來保護記憶體內內容，這可以防止反向工程把電路反推出來。本文使用邏輯混淆來實現記憶體的地址被打亂。除此之外，在本文中提出的操作可以通過不需要多增加腳位的方式來執行此記憶體，其中包含寫密鑰模式和一般安全模式。
透過二十二奈米之邏輯製程技術，本篇論文實現了1Mb之基於磁性記憶體的預解碼器邏輯混淆。對於測量結果，與先前傳統電路相比，在安全模式下，本文的操作速度僅比ㄧ般記憶體模式下增加了1.96％。不過我們達到防止反向攻擊以及暴力破解法之攻擊。在安全模式下，本篇論文達到了0.9ns的量測讀取速度於零點八伏特之操作電壓下

With the globalization of the IC supply chain, it introduces increasing privacy risks and security. Most of important things are IP theft that can through reverse engineering technique and the design modified by malicious foundry. Therefore, logic obfuscation is the research target that can help to thwart reverse engineering by malicious foundries.
Logic obfuscation is one way to thwart reverse engineering, even though we disclose a partially ambiguous circuit to attackers. The logic obfuscation technique is one technique for popular IC protections. The design concept is adding some circuits in the memory, makes our circuit with logic obfuscation. If we use the wrong key to operate the function, we will get the fault result. Therefore, even though someone extracts a netlist the design to steal the valuable　information by reverse engineering, we can use the logic obfuscation method to protect the information.
Here, we propose a pre-decoder based on MRAM to protect memory content, which can prevent reverse engineering to reverse the circuit. This circuit use logic obfuscation to achieve memory addresses scrambling. In addition, the proposed scheme operation can execute by special operation mode which does not need more pins to operate the mode including Write-key mode and Security-normal mode.
Based on 22nm CMOS logic process, we fabricate a 1Mb a pre-decoder logic obfuscation based on MRAM. This work only increases 1.96% in Security mode respectively than Normal mode. But we defense reverse engineering attack and brute force attack. For the measurement results, this work achieves 3.32ns at VDD=0.8V measured access time in Security mode.

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