「科學實在論與反實在論之爭」關注的是，我們應當如何看待科學理論當中涉及不可觀察事物的描述，實在論主張應按字面意義去理解並相信理論該部分的說法為真，而反實在論反對之。

本文研究的對象是范佛勞生（Bas C. van Fraassen）在一九八〇年出版《科學圖像》（The Scientific Image）一書時所提出的「建構經驗論」（Constructive Empiricism）。建構經驗論屬於一種反實在論立場，其主張我們僅有理由相信理論為經驗上完備（empirically adequate），而沒有理由相信理論為真，亦即僅有理由相信理論有關可觀察事物的描述為真，而沒有理由相信理論有關不可觀察事物的描述亦為真。

本文企圖透過重建及分析范佛勞生的論證，時而輔以其他哲學家的看法，以評估建構經驗論是否站得住腳。為了做到這點，我們將本文的工作分為三部分：（一）指出建構經驗論在哪些地方承繼又有別於他先前的反實在論立場，藉以界定他的論敵是誰以及該進行哪些論證；（二）重建並檢視范佛勞生所提出用以瓦解其論敵主張的消極論證；（三）重建並檢視他用來支持建構經驗論的積極論證。在結論上我們指出，范佛勞生雖然成功地給出消極論證，但要想證成建構經驗論無非得倚靠一個成功的積極論證，而根據本文的分析，截至一九八五年為止，他所提出的兩個積極論證均未能完成被賦予的任務。

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