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研究生: 鄧保三
Dembo Sankareh
論文名稱: EFFECTS OF VARYING DATA RATES ON ACCESS POINT CLOCK SKEW
資料傳輸率變異影響無線存取點的時鐘偏移之研究
指導教授: 孫宏民
Sun, Hung-Min
口試委員:
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 電機資訊學院 - 資訊系統與應用研究所
Institute of Information Systems and Applications
論文出版年: 2009
畢業學年度: 97
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 56
中文關鍵詞: Clock SkewsIEEE 802.11Wireless NetworksSecurityManagement FramesMedium Access Control
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  • The last few years have seen explosive growth in deployment of Wireless Networks and use of Wireless devices. Advances in micro-technology and the need for ubiquitous services are the driving forces behind the ever growing popularity of Wireless networks. Unfortunately, IEEE 802.11 came under intense criticism since its standardization due to its design flaws. In Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), the Key Management protocol does not protect Management and Control frames. This vulnerability has drawn the attention of researchers in academia and also industry experts. In their quest for securing WLANs, several proposals both cryptographic and non-cryptographic have been advanced but none seem to be efficient.
    Since most adversaries will launch attack against Access Points (AP) in one way or the other, our work is based on the exploitation of small microscopic deviations called clock skews of APs. In our work, we reaffirmed that the clock skew of an AP can be used as it fingerprint and also went further to estimate the clock under different conditions and with varying network loads; changing fingerprinter location; rebooting AP. While our proposal does not detect fakeAps and Medium Access Control (MAC) address spoofing in its entirety, but we have shown that when AP is rebooted it takes time before the clock skew become consistent. The beauty of our works is that it does not add any overhead to the IEEE 802.11standard.


    Acknowledgments III List of Tables VI List of Figures VI Chapter 1 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Related Work 2 1.2 Motivation 3 1.3 Synopsis 5 Chapter 2 6 2.1 IEEE 802.11 Basic Security Features 6 2.2 IEEE 802.11 MAC Frame Types 8 2.3 Major Wireless Threats 10 2.4 IEEE 802.11i 13 Chapter 3 19 Related Work 19 3.1 Clock Skews Overview 19 3.2 Device Clock Skew as its Fingerprint 22 3.3 Unauthorized AP Detection using Clock Skews 26 3.4 Received Signal Strength for MAC Spoofing Detection 30 3.5 Sequence Number-based Spoofing Detection 34 Chapter 4 37 Evaluation Method 37 4.1 Estimating AP Clock Skew 39 4.1.1 Least Square Fitting (LSF) 39 Chapter 5 41 Experiment 41 5.1 Experiment on AP Clock Skew 41 5.1.1 Experiment Environment 41 5.1.2 Experimental Results 44 Chapter 6 50 Conclusion and Future Research Direction 50 Bibliography 52

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