在壅塞賽局中，每一個玩家都可以根據自己的策略去決定該使用哪些資源，而選擇
同一資源的人數多寡會相對應地給該資源玩家帶來延遲；玩家的目的則是最小化自己
的延遲。在這篇論文中，我們提出了考慮「等待時間」的壅塞賽局。「等待」這件事
情是被先前的人所忽略的，但在現實生活中卻是隨處可見，如上班族會預期交通尖峰
時段特別壅塞，而傾向更早或更晚出門，使在路上的花費時間變少，讓其時間使用效
能更好。在本論文中，我們使用了不同的方法去證明對這種新的壅塞賽局模型來說，
是可以達到近似納許均衡，且這些方法各有特色，可以是由中央控管，也可以是無政
府狀態。最後也證明了當玩家數眾多時，我們得到的最壞均衡比是很靠近1的。

In a congestion game, each player can decide which resource to use based on their own
strategy. The number of players choosing a particular resource will cause latency for each
of the corresponding players. Each player’s objective is to minimize her own latency. In
this thesis, we propose a congestion game that takes waiting time into consideration, where
the notion of waiting has been overlooked by previous studies, but yet it is ubiquitous
in real life. For example, commuters expect heavy traffic during peak hours and tend to
leave for work earlier or later than needed to reduce overall travel time, thus utilizing
their time better. We use different algorithms to find approximate Nash equilibria in this
new form of congestion game. These algorithms have different characteristics, such as
centrally controlled, or in a state of anarchy. Finally, we also demonstrate when there are
many players, the price of anarchy is very close to 1.

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