我國政府於2006年正式引進獨立董事與審計委員會制度並予以法典化。為了加強獨立董事的專業性和獨立性，2006年金融監督管理委員會規定公開發行公司之獨立董事兼任其他公開發行公司獨立董事不得超過三間，並且在2016年證券交易所進一步地規範獨立董事不宜同時擔任超過五家上市上櫃公司之董事（包含外部董事）或監察人，加強獨立董事執行職務之績效。本文章旨在探討政府機關藉由修訂法令限制獨立董事公司在外兼職的制度，其實施對公司關係人交易比例以及財務績效之影響如何。實證結果顯示，在法律公布之後，本文所選定的關係人交易比率傾向於較低，並且整體而言，皆對財務績效Tobin’s Q產生正面的影響，此實證結果支持獨立董事的忙碌性降低，能夠使他們增加監督企業的效率，監督效率比法律公布之前佳，進一步使公司經營績效提升，並且改善公司治理環境。

In 2006, the government formally introduced the systems of independent directors and audit committee. Since 2006, Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C.（FSC）have begun to publicize the importance of usefulness and effectiveness of independence as a dominant director characteristic. Therefore, FSC required that independent directors should not serve as an independent director of more than three other public companies. In 2016, TSE mandated an independent director shall not hold office concurrently as a director (including independent director) or supervisor of more than five other TWSE/TPEx listed companies. The purpose of this article is to investigate the impact of aforementioned rules on related party transactions (RPTs) and financial performance of companies by the using the identification strategy of Difference in Difference. The results show that after the laws were announced, the RPT selected in this article were reduced. The regulations had a positive impact on financial performance. Decreasing independent directors’ business can enable them to increase the efficiency of monitoring the company, which further improves the company's operating performance.

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