在無線隨意網路上安全通訊之研究｜國立清華大學博碩士論文庫

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研究生：	陳烱勳 Chen, Chiung-Hsun
論文名稱：	在無線隨意網路上安全通訊之研究 A Study of Secure Communications on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
指導教授：	孫宏民
口試委員:	曾文貴謝續平黃育綸賴尚宏楊舜仁黃慶育孫宏民
學位類別：	博士 Doctor
系所名稱：	電機資訊學院 - 資訊工程學系 Computer Science
論文出版年：	2012
畢業學年度：	100
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	101
中文關鍵詞：	無線隨意網路、竊聽攻擊、偽裝攻擊、丟棄攻擊、共謀攻擊、節點隱私
外文關鍵詞：	MANETs, eavesdropping attacks, forged attacks, dropping attacks, collusion attacks, node privacy
相關次數：	點閱：2 下載：0
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由於無線隨意網路沒有固定的基礎建設，例如網路路由器與中央控管中心…等，且使用開放式的傳輸媒介，攻擊者可以很容易的達成竊聽攻擊、偽裝攻擊、丟棄攻擊以及共謀攻擊。透過這些攻擊，攻擊者可中斷傳輸、傳送錯誤訊息誤導接收者以及透過分析監聽封包得之節點隱私(位址,身分,路由資訊)。因此我們預期的研究目標是針對竊聽攻擊、偽裝攻擊、丟棄攻擊以及共謀攻擊，提出相對應的通訊協定，包含抵擋攻擊及保護節點隱私。基於我們所提出的機制，攻擊者不再能夠透過分析竊聽封包，去得知傳送者以及接收者的相關資料，包含位置與身分。
此外，當攻擊者發動封包丟棄攻擊時，即便攻擊者同部發動共謀攻擊，攻擊者也無法避免被偵測並排除於路由路徑之外，提供高可靠度的傳輸。

Because Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) lack the stationary infrastructures, such as network routers and adopt open wireless medium for communications, attackers can launch eavesdropping attacks, forged attacks, dropping attacks, and collusion attacks. To utilize these attacks, attackers can interrupt communications, send error message to receiver, and analyze the eavesdropping messages to destroy node privacy of sender and receiver. Node privacy contains identity privacy, location privacy, and route anonymity. Therefore, our expected research topic focuses on these attacks to propose the corresponding protocols. In our protocols, attackers cannot obtain any information about sender and receiver from analyzing the eavesdropping messages.
Moreover, our protocols can resist dropping attacks and collusion attacks, and the attackers will not participate in route discovery.

List of Tables xiii
List of Figures xiii
Introduction 1
1 Motivation and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Organization . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 5
Related Work 8
1 Anonymous routing protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1 ASR . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 MASK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 SDAR and SDDR . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 9
1.4 ARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 10
1.5 ANODR . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Secure routing protocol against Routing Disruptions 11
2.1 Watchdog . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . 12
2.2 ExWatchdog . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 HADOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 SPROUT . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 PCBHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Node Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Group signature scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
4 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 15
4.1 Attack models . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . 15
4.2 RREQ/RREP Flooding Attacks . . . . . . . . . .    17
4.3 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 19
CRP System Design 21
1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 RREQ phase . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 RREP phase . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 Data transmission phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
EASR system design 32
1 Overview . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Anonymous Group Key Generation . . .. . . . . . . . 33
3 Route Request Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 Route Reply Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vii
5 Anonymous Data Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Security Analysis of CRP 45
1 Black hole and gray hole attacks . . . . . . . . .  46
2 Modify and fake packet attacks . . . . . . . . . .  46
3 Rushing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Collusion attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Intermediate nodes launch collusion attacks . . . 47
4.2 Monitor nodes launch collusion attacks . . . . .  48
4.3 Intermediate node and monitor node launch collusion attacks 48
Security Analysis of EASR 49
1 Types of Adversaries . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 49
2 Traffic Analysis Attacks . . . . . . .  . . . . . . 50
2.1 Timing analysis and node flushing attacks . . . . 50
2.2 Message coding attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
3 Intersection attacks . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 52
4 Active Attacks . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1 RREQ/RREP flooding attacks . . . . . . . . .. . . 53
4.2 Replay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 53
5 Anonymity Analysis . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 54
5.1 Identity Privacy . . . . . .    . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2 Route Anonymity . . . . .   . . . . . . . . . . . 54
viii
5.3 Location Privacy . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6 Computation Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 55
Evaluation 58
1 Simulation of SRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.1 Packet delivery ratio comparisons . . . . . . .   59
1.2 Routing overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 64
2 Simulation of EASR . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 65
2.1 Impact of mobility . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 66
2.2 Impact of traffic load . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 68
2.3 Impact of flooding attacks . . .. . . . . . . . . 70
2.4 Impact of Message Coding Attacks . . . . . . . .  71
Conclusion 78
1 A Brief Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . 78
2 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Bibliography 80
                                

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