在我們的生活中充斥著許多的事實，其中有些事實屬於世界本身，它們不需要依賴人類所訂立的制度便可以成立，像是玉山比陽明山高這樣的事實不需要制度去支持便可為真；另外有一些事實則必須依賴人類的制度才得以成立，如歐巴馬是美國的總統，這個事實必須要依賴人類所制定的政治制度才能成真。

當代的哲學家瑟爾（John Searle）在Making the Social World : the Structure of Human Civilization 一書中區別了上述的兩種事實，其中那些必須依賴人類所創造的制度才得以成立的事實，他給予了一個專有名詞，叫做制度性事實（institutional facts），同時又稱社會事實（social facts）。在這本書中，瑟爾整理了一套他稱之為「社會建構論」（Social Construction）的理論，這套理論是關於社會事實如何產生，與社會事實如何運作在人類的行為當中的理論。而瑟爾的目標是給出一個自然化的解釋，這代表這套理論必須符合我們當前對人類的了解，包括單一個體、意向性與行動。為了組織社會建構論，瑟爾利用了他早期所提出的意向性和語言行動的理論做為社會建構論的基礎，試圖在相同的型式之下發展出一套完整的社會理論。

本篇論文分為四章。為了展現社會建構論的內在結構，我會在第一章介紹意向性與語言行動理論，在第二章介紹社會建構論；在第三章將「語言」這個社會事實拿出來討論，藉此檢視社會建構論的結構，並試圖補強其不足之處；第四章將納入二手文獻來討論社會建構論的一些相關概念，並且對社會建構論提出質疑。

社會事實是本篇論文主要關心的概念，社會事實作為一種特別的概念，同時衍生出許多值得探討的地方。本文的主旨有二，第一，鋪陳瑟爾的社會建構論，藉由對社會建構論的了解，能夠更清楚地去分析社會事實的概念，同時提供討論的材料；第二，對社會建構論可能面臨的問題做更深入的討論，在可行之處補足理論的缺失，另外也提出自己對社會建構論的質疑，希望能對理論的完善有所幫助。

John Searle distinguished two kinds of fact: one belongs to the world itself and the other, which he called “institutional fact” or “social fact”, depends on human institutions. This paper is mainly concerned with Searle’s theory of social facts. The first chapter delineates his theories of Intentionality and speech acts, serving as the basis of his theory of social construction, the framework of which is exposed in the chapter two. Chapter three tries to give a solution to a problem generated from the fact that language, which is an essential element of social fact, is in itself a social fact. Finally, in chapter four, some challenges to Searle's theory of social fact are discussed.

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John R. Searle, Intentionality : an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1983.

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Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology, Springer, 2007.