使用納許均衡規劃模型來探討時間帶競爭對航空公司盈利能力的影響

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研究生：	馮元 Feng, Yuan
論文名稱：	使用納許均衡規劃模型來探討時間帶競爭對航空公司盈利能力的影響 Using Nash Equilibrium Programming Models to Explore the Impact of Slots Competition on Profitability of Airlines
指導教授：	李雨青 Lee, Yu-Ching
口試委員:	冼芻蕘 Sin, Chor-Yiu 王小璠 Wang, Hsiao-Fan
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	工學院 - 工業工程與工程管理學系 Department of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
論文出版年：	2018
畢業學年度：	106
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	86
中文關鍵詞：	航空競爭、時間帶競爭、時間帶縮減、賽局理論、納許均衡、起飛時間帶
外文關鍵詞：	airline competition, slot competition, slot reduction, game theory, Nash Equilibrium, takeoff slots
相關次數：	點閱：2 下載：0
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在航空市場中，航空公司在特定時間內爭奪有限的機場時間帶以增加自己的
市場份額並擠出其他競爭者。這種與航空公司頻率競爭密切相關的機場時間帶競
賽是航空公司業務戰略的重要組成部分。我們建立了一個基於出發機場為主的均
衡規劃模型，該模型計算確切的飛行頻率均衡解來分析航空公司的盈利能力。航
空公司的利潤都受到所有航空公司同時調整的航班頻率的影響。在納許均衡解下
，任何航空公司都不能通過單方面改變航班頻率來增加利潤。我們從Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker（KKT）條件推導出均衡公式，這是個別航空公司利潤最大化問題的
必要和充分最優條件。然後，我們將所有航空公司的KKT 條件連接起來，形成均
衡規劃模型，這意味著所有航空公司的最優性同時成立。針對滿足市場需求和限
制航班總數的兩種不同情境的實際數據數值研究均表明，航空公司應該沿著利潤
更高的航線集中和飛行。此均衡規劃模型是可以被擴展的，例如，對於從航空公
司之間到聯盟之間的賽局或是從一個機場到包含多個機場的網絡設置賽局。最後
，我們針對不同規模的競爭賽局進行了經驗性的均衡分析。
關鍵字：航空競爭、時間帶競爭、時間帶縮減、賽局理論、納許均衡、起飛時間
帶

In the airline market, companies compete on the right to use a limited number of
airport slots at specific times to increase their own market share and squeeze out the
others. This ongoing airport slot competition, which is also closely related to the airline
frequency competition, is an important part of the business strategy of airline
companies. We establish a departure-airport-based equilibrium programming model,
which computes the exact flight-frequency equilibrium solution to analyze the
profitability of airlines. The profits of all airlines are affected by the frequencies of
flights that are adjusted simultaneously by all airlines. Under the Nash equilibrium
solution, no airline can increase profits by unilaterally changing the flight frequency.
We derive the equilibrium formula from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition, a
necessary and sufficient optimality condition of the profits maximizing problem for
individual airlines. Then, we concatenated the KKT conditions of all airlines and
formed the equilibrium programming model, which means that the optimality for all
airlines is simultaneously held. The real-data numerical studies for two different
scenarios, aimed at satisfying the market demand and restricting the total number of
flights, both indicate that the airlines should concentrate and fly more frequently along
higher lucrative routes. The equilibrium programming model is scalable for setting a
game from between airlines to between alliances and from one airport to a network
containing multiple airports. Finally, we conducted an empirical equilibrium analysis
for different scales of the competition.
Keywords: airline competition, slot competition, slot reduction, game theory, Nash
Equilibrium, takeoff slots

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... III
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ VI
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ VIII
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Capacitated resources competition ......................................................... 1
1.2 More facts and importance about frequencies competition in airline
industry ..................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Current practice to determine numbers of time slots .............................. 4
1.4 Time slots trading and leasing ................................................................ 6
1.5 More facts and statistics about Alliances in airline industry ................... 7
1.5.1 Low Cost Carrier in compeition/alliances ...................................... 8
1.6 The goals and contributions of this study ............................................... 9
Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................................. 14
2.1 Airport time slots allocation and flight frequencies competition .......... 14
2.2 The alliances of firms and cooperative games in common resources
competition ............................................................................................. 15
2.3 Inventory transshipment and transshipment pricing in supply
competition ............................................................................................. 16
2.4 Equilibrium programming method for computing equilibrium in other
markets .................................................................................................... 16
2.5 Data ....................................................................................................... 17
Chapter 3 Methodology .......................................................................................... 21
3.1 Assumptions and Model Introduction ................................................... 21
3.2 Basic Model .......................................................................................... 25
3.3 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Condition Constrained Basic Model .................. 26
3.4 Two Scenarios ....................................................................................... 27
3.5 Alliances Model .................................................................................... 28
3.6 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Condition Constrained Alliances Model ............ 32
3.7 Network Model ..................................................................................... 33
3.8 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Condition Constrained Network Model ............ 34
3.9 Constraints to guarantee the better equilibrium solution ...................... 36
Chapter 4 Numerical Result .................................................................................. 38
4.1 Data Source ........................................................................................... 38
4.2 Parameter Estimation ............................................................................ 39
4.3 Outcome of Basic Model ...................................................................... 41
4.3.1 Comparison of flight frequency .................................................... 41
4.3.2 Comparison of the total number of passengers ............................. 44
4.3.3 Comparison of the total Operating Profits .................................... 46
4.4 Outcome of Alliances Model ................................................................ 48
4.4.1 Comparison of flight frequency with Original Data between
Alliances Model and Basic Model .......................................................... 49
4.4.2 Comparison of total operating profits with Original Data between
Alliances Model and Basic Model .......................................................... 52
4.4.3 Summary ....................................................................................... 54
4.5 Outcome of the Network Model ........................................................... 56
4.5.1 The comparison of the number of routes with the Original data .. 56
4.5.2 The analysis of the total operating profits ..................................... 57
4.5.3 The analysis of the frequency of the flight ................................... 57
4.6 Slots Reduction ..................................................................................... 65
Chapter 5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 67
References ................................................................................................................... 71
Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 77
                                

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