我國主管機關自1998年起向國內公開發行公司宣導公司治理之重要性，並於2013年發布為期五年的「公司治理藍圖」，其中五大計畫項目包含促進股東行動主義。本研究欲探討促進股東行動主義的形式之一—設立強制性電子投票機制的影響。台灣於2005年借鑑美國來修正公司法，為提升公司治理而引進通訊投票制度。金管會也自2012年起強制部分資本額較大之大型上市櫃公司應將電子方式列為表決權行使管道之一，並且在2018年起，強制全體上市櫃公司招開股東會時須採納電子投票，讓投資人多一個行使表決權的管道。故在此環境背景下，本研究將分析強制性電子投票制度對於公司治理及公司價值的影響，並針對不同資料區間做相關探討。
本研究實證結果發現，受強制性電子投票法令變更影響的公司，財務績效方面不論長期還是短期均呈顯著負報酬。在公司治理方面，這些受法令變更影響的公司其控制股東之席次比率有顯著的降低，意味著強制性實施電子投票制度這項法令衝擊確實能夠有效的改善公司治理層面。

Since 1998, government of Taiwan have announced the importance of corporate governance to public companies. In 2013, they issued a five-year “Corporate Governance Blueprint”, in which five major projects include the promotion of shareholder activism. This study wants to explore one of the ways of promoting shareholder activism—the impact of mandated electronic voting. In 2005, Taiwan amended The Company Act and created a communication voting to improve corporate governance. Part of large-scale listed and OTC companies has been forced to accept electronic voting as a voting way from 2012. And from 2018, all listed and OTC companies must adopt electronic voting when they have the shareholders meeting. This allow investors have one more method to exercise their voting rights. Therefore, in this context, this study will analyze the impact of mandated electronic voting on corporate governance and corporate value, and make some discussions on different data intervals.
The empirical results found that companies affected by mandated electronic voting have significant negative returns on financial performance in both long-term and short-term. In terms of corporate governance, the number of controlling seats of companies affected by the law has been significantly reduced, which means that the mandatory implementation of the electronic voting can effectively improve the corporate governance.

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