A proposal of a BDI based software framework for designing autonomous agents that simulate a subset of human society that is developed from a sociology perspective. It can be applied to computer gaming and simulation environments. By applying this framework, the interactions among the simulated humans should better reflect how humans simulate with one another.

Books:
□ Arrow, Kenneth Joseph; The Limits of Organization
□ Axelrod, Robert; The Evolution of Cooperation
□ Axelrod, Robert; The Complexity of Cooperation
□ Bigus, Joseph P.; Bigus, Jennifer; Constructing Intelligent Agents Using Data
□ Cyert, Richard Michael; March, James G; A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
□ Epstein, Joshua; Growing Artificial Societies : social science from the bottom up
□ Henderson-Sellers, Brian; Giorgini, Paolo; Agent-Otiented Methodologies
□ Keohane, Robert; “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy”
□ Krasner, Stephen D; “International Regimes”
□ Matthews, Ronald R.; “U.S. Senators and Their World”
□ Rosenschein, J.S.; Zlotkin, G. Z.; “Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among Computers.”
□ Russell, S.; Norvig, P; Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
□ Scott, John F; “Internalization of Norms”
□ Sherif, Muzafer; “The Psychology of Social Norms”
□ Trumanm, Ben C,; “Field of Honor: A Complete and Comprehensive History of Dueling in All Countries”.
□ Wooldridge, Michael J.; Introduction to Multiagent Systems

Academic Papers:

□ Ackermann, Martain; Lin, Chao; 2004; “Evolution of Cooperation: Two for One?”; Current Biology: 14:R73-R74
□ Asch, Solomon E; 1951; “Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment” Groups, Leadership, and Men; 177-190
□ Asch, Solomon E; 1956; “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority”; Psychological Monographs; 41:258-290
□ Axelrod, Robert; 1980; “Effective Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma”; Journal of Conflict and Resolution; 24:3-25
□ Axelrod, Robert; 1980; “More Effective Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma” ; Journal of Conflict and Resolution”; 24:379-403
□ Axelrod. Robert; Keohane, Robert; 1986; “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”; Cooperation Under Anarchy; 226-254
□ Axelrod. Robert; 1988; “The Further Evolution of Cooperation”, Science; 242:1385-1390
□ Axelrod, Robert; Bennett, Scott D.; 1993; “A Landscape Theory of Aggregation”; British Journal of Political Science; 23:221-233
□ Bendor, Jonathan; Kramer, Roderick M; Stout, Suzanne; 1991; “When in Doubt… Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma”; 25:691-719
□ Bendor, Jonathan; 1993; “Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation”; Journal of Conflict Resolution; 37:709-704
□ Boyd, R.; 1989; “Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”; Journal of Conflict Resolution; 35; 691-719
□ Carley, Kathleen; 1981; “A Theory of Group Stability”; American Sociological Review; 56:331-354
□ Devlin, JF; 1995; "Technology and innovation in retail banking distribution"; International Journal of Bank Marketing; 13:19-25
□ Dignum, Frank; 1999; “Autonomous agents with norms”; Artificial Intelligence and Law; 7:69-79
□ Elliott, Euel; Keil L. Douglas;2002; “Exploring Cooperation and Competition Using Agent-Based Modeling”; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America; 7293-7194
□ Hamel, Gary; Doz, Yves L.; Prahalad, C.K; 1989; “Collaborate with Your Competitors – and Win”; Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb)
□ Katz, Michael L.; Shapiro, Carl; 1985; “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility”; American Economic Review; 75:424-220
□ Kandori, Michihiro; 1992; "Social Norms and Community Enforcement"; Review of Economic Studies; 59:63-80
□ Kollock, Peter; 1993; “An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind”; American Sociological Review; 58:768-786
□ Kraines, David; Kraines, Vivian; 1995; “Evolution of Learning among Pavlov Strategies in a Competitive Environment with Noise”; The Journal of Conflict Resolution; 39:439-466
□ Krehbiel, Keith; 1985; “Unanimous Consent Agreement: Going Along in the Senate”; Working paper no. 568; California Institute of Technology, Social Science Department
□ Martin Posch, 1997. "Cycling in a stochastic learning algorithm for normal form games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 7 (2) pp. 193-207
□ Molander, P.; 1985; “The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain, Environment”; Journal of Conflict Resolution 29; 611-618
□ Moutinho, Luiz; Smith, Anne; 2000; "Modelling bank customer satisfaction through mediation of attitudes towards human and automated banking"; 18:124-134
□ Mui, Lik; Mohtashemi, Mojdeh; Halberstadt, Ari, 2002; "Notions of reputation in multi-agents systems: a review"; International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
□ Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1; 280-287
□ Rao, Anad; George Michael; 1995; "BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice"; Technical Note; Australian Articial Intelligence Institute
□ Opp, Karl-Dieter; 1979; “The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms. A Confrontation of Some Hypothesis of Sociology”; KYKLOS; 32:775-801
□ Ostrom, E; 1998; "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action"; The American Political Science Review
□ Rajan, Roby; 1989; “Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies”; International Economic Review; 30:863-876
□ Sandholm, Tuomas; 1999; "Automated Negoriation"; Communications of the ACM; 42:84-85
□ Sugden, R, “The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare”.
□ Wu, Jianzhong; Axelrod, Robert; 1995; “How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma”, Journal of Conflict Resolution; 39:183-189

Websites:
□ Adobe
□ http://www.adobe.com/cfusion/showcase/index.cfm?event=casestudydetail&casestudyid=36295&loc=zh_tw
□ Jade - Java Agent DEvelopment Framework
□ http://jade.tilab.com/
□ StratX:
□ http://www.stratx.com/index.php?niv1=whoweworkwith&niv2=casestudies&niv3=&id=102
□ WikiPedia
□ http://en.wikipedia.org/