Dilithium數位簽章系統的安全性估計｜國立清華大學博碩士論文庫

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研究生：	蔡秉邕 Tsai, Ping-Yung
論文名稱：	Dilithium數位簽章系統的安全性估計 Security Estimate of Dilithium Digital Signature Scheme
指導教授：	陳君明 Chen, Jiun-Ming 魏福村 Wei, Fu-Tsun
口試委員:	陳榮傑 Chen, Rong-Jaye 楊柏因 Yang, Bo-Yin
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	理學院 - 數學系 Department of Mathematics
論文出版年：	2022
畢業學年度：	110
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	38
中文關鍵詞：	密碼學、後量子密碼學、晶格、容錯學習問題、CRYSTALS-Dilithium
外文關鍵詞：	cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, lattice, LWE, CRYSTALS-Dilithium
相關次數：	點閱：2 下載：0
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本論文我們會先介紹CRYSTALS-Dilithium，這是NIST後量子密碼標準第三輪候選者之一。它由三個晶格類問題所構成：MLWE、MSIS以及SelfTargetMSIS。然後我們會試著使用Ruck¨uert和Schneider所發表的模型來估計其安全性。然而，Dilithium在設計上有不少跟常見假設不同的地方，比如說它使用ℓ∞-norm而不是ℓ2-norm，以及它的LWE假設使用均勻分布，而一般而言高斯分布是更為廣泛使用。除了提出前述問題的解決方法外，我們修改了Ruck¨ uert和Schneider的原始模型。原文中LWE問題被轉成SIS問題，但為了因應新型的Dual attack，我們將LWE轉成ISIS問題，以讓LWE類問題的安全性估計更為符合當下的發展。

We introduce one of the 3rd round candidates of the NIST PQC Standardization: CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which has three underlying lattice problems: MLWE, MSIS, and SelfTargetMSIS. Then we try to estimate its security via Ruck¨uert and Schneider’s framework. The Dilithium signature scheme is well designed in parameter choice, performance, and security. But there are many differences compared to common primitives. For example, Dilithium uses ℓ∞-norm, while ℓ2-norm is more common. This would lead to vector lengths beyond the ring size q. Besides, the error term in LWE is uniformly sampled, rather than Gaussian. We discussed how to deal with these troubles, improve the original framework, and modify its procedure when estimating LWE. While the original framework uses the dual attack to interpret LWE into the SIS, we interpret it into ISIS problem, which is more frequently applied in recent papers.

Declaration of Authorship i
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
Introduction 1
1 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Preliminaries 3
1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Lattices and Its Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 NTT Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Fiat-Shamir Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1 Example: Ed25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5 Falcon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Dilithium Signature Scheme 11
1 Basic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Key Size Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Bit String Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Hint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Complete Dilithium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Mathematical Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 UF-CMA Security Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Security Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5 Dilithium-QROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Framework of Estimating the Average-case Lattice Problems 25
1 Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.1 SIS to HSVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2 LWE to SIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Lenstra’s Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Application 29
1 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.1 LWE to ISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A Results 37
                                

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