本論文之二個章節主要涵蓋台灣公司融資與投資決策的實證議題，並且皆以台灣上市上櫃與未上市上櫃公司作為實證研究對象。第一章為實證探討在景氣循環過程中，公司融資決策與槓桿比率的變化與特色，第二章為實證研究公司上市與否對於其投資決策的影響。

第一章之研究動機起始於近年來的實證研究，例如:Koo (2009 )與 Jordà et al. (2013, 2015) 等文獻證實經濟體系的債務順景氣循環地膨脹與收縮是擴大景氣波動幅度的重要因素之一。但是在公司資本結構理論中，關於公司債務是否也呈現順景氣循環波動的看法不一。本章利用1986-2014年台灣 2838 家上市上櫃與1289 家未上市上櫃公司財務報表資料建構追蹤資料，據以探討在不同階段的景氣狀態下，公司債務融資、股權融資與槓桿比率的變化。本章實證研究的主要發現如下: (1) 台灣上市上櫃與未上市上櫃公司的債務融資均呈現順景氣循環的特徵，但是具有順景氣循環特徵的股權融資只出現在未上市上櫃公司；(2) 債權融資的順循環特徵在中大型公司中特別顯著，而股權融資的順循環特徵則在小公司中特別明顯；(3) 股權融資的順景氣循環特徵在年輕且低槓桿公司中特別顯著，其槓桿比率呈現較強烈的逆景氣循環。在上述實證中，本章發現規模小的公司通常是年輕、低槓桿的公司，規模大的公司則通常是成熟、高槓桿的公司，而此反映本章實證發現與 Berger & Udell (1998) 企業金融生命週期理論 (financial growth cycle theory of business) 所預測的結果一致。

第二章的研究著重於探討股票市場在公司投資決策中扮演的角色，檢驗公司上市對於投資活動的影響是否反映經理人短視行為，抑或是外部融資的好處。本章實證研究以公司研究發展投資 (R&D投資) 為例，利用台灣未上市上櫃公司未於股票市場發行股票的特性，將其作為檢驗上市上櫃公司投資行為的對比樣本，並藉由比較此二類型公司的R&D投資對投資機會敏感度，以釐清股票市場對於上市上櫃公司投資活動的影響。透過動態 R&D 投資模型的建構以及利用System GMM 進行實證模型估計，本章實證結果發現:上市上櫃公司的 R&D 投資對於投資機會敏感度低於未上市上櫃公司，而造成此二類型公司的敏感度差異與其內部資金充裕與否有關:在內部資金較充裕的群組中，來自股票市場的壓力可能造成上市上櫃公司的 R&D 投資對投資機會敏感度低於未上市上櫃公司；但在內部資金較不充裕的群組中，來自於股票市場的壓力與融資上的好處可能相互抵消，此二類型公司的 R&D 投資對投資機會敏感度並無顯著差異。

This dissertation studies the topics on firms' financial policy and investment policy and focuses on Taiwan’s publicly listed firms and unlisted firms. The first chapter aims to empirical study how the firms finance over the business cycles, and the second chapter attempts to explore the impact of stock market listing on firms’ investment policy.

In the first chapter, our study is motivated by the finding in recent literature that expansion and contraction of “credit” (or debt) has played an important role in the genesis and severity of many business cycles, e.g., Koo (2009) and Jordà et al. (2013, 2015). However, among the studies regarding firm financing behavior over business cycles, no consensus has been reached on both theoretical and empirical fronts. In this chapter, we employ data on Taiwan’s 2838 publicly listed firms and 1289 unlisted firms over the 1986-2014 period to study the patterns of firm debt finance, equity finance and leverage ratio. Through our panel regressions of changes in firms’ debt and equity on firms’ sales, internal cash flow, tangibility of assets, and cyclical macro variables, we reach the following observations: (1) firms’ debt financing exhibits clear pro-cyclical pattern for both listed and unlisted firms while equity financing exhibits clear pro-cyclical pattern for unlisted firms but not listed firms, (2) the pro-cyclicality of debt financing is more prominent for medium to large-sized firms while the pro-cyclicality of equity financing is more prominent for small to medium-sized unlisted firms, and (3) younger firms and firms with lower leverage tend to exhibit stronger pro-cyclical pattern in equity financing but less pro-cyclical pattern in debt financing. As smaller-sized unlisted firms are usually with young age and with a lower leverage ratio and larger sized firms are usually more mature and with higher leverage, our above findings are consistent with each other and with the prediction of Berger and Udell (1998)’s “financial growth cycle theory of business”.

In the second chapter, our study investigates how firms’ investment decisions are affected by stock market listing. On the one hand, low-cost capital obtained from the stock markets can relieve a firm financial constraints and induce listed firms to pursue investment activities, but on the other hand, stock market pressures induce listed firms to invest myopically. To help disentangle aforementioned opposing possibilities, we focus on R&D investment and employ a sample of listed and unlisted Taiwan firms over the period 1986-2014 to examine whether the difference between the investment behaviors of listed and unlisted firms are a direct result of their difference in market-listing status. Our empirical results show that the impact of a firm’s listing status on its R&D expenditures depends on its internal capital. The sensitivity of R&D investment to investment opportunities is higher in unlisted firms with large internal capital compared to listed firms with similar internal capital characteristics, while the difference between the R&D investment sensitivities to investment opportunities in listed and unlisted firms with small internal capital are insignificant. These findings suggest that due to the sufficient internal capital and the lack of stock market pressure, unlisted firms are better positioned for taking advantage of investment opportunities than listed firms.

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