網路服務(web service)為企業或組織之系統整合提供一個良好的技術平台，各部門或組織成員將工作發佈成網路服務，以供其他部門或組織成員使用。我們需要一個良好的網路服務分配機制，有效率地幫助我們匹配服務需求者至所需之服務。良好的分配機制應該顧及服務需求者與服務提供者之整體利益，並能解決需求衝突之問題。
應用經濟學的概念於分散式計算，為市場精神所在；市場本身由許多自私(self-interest)的個體所組成，透過既合作且競爭(Cooperation and Competition model)的方式自由競爭、各取所需，以達到供需平衡。市場如同一隻隱形之推手(invisible hand)，將複雜的問題推向一個穩定的結果，該結果是否如我們所預期？就要看我們如何去設計這個市場。
網路服務需求者與網路服務提供者可能在一個企業內部網路(intranet)，亦或是分散於不同的網路環境中，需求者與提供者自由競爭、各取所需，如同一個渾然天成的市場環境；我們利用經濟學上之理論，包含生產函數、組合式拍賣等來設計適合本系統架構之價格策略、底價訂定策略與效用函數等；一旦健全的市場建立，利用市場之隱形推手，最後終將推導至我們預期之結果，也就是一個最佳化服務需求者與服務提供者之整體利益的網路服務分配方式。
另外在設計市場環境之前，我們必須了解網路服務本身的一些屬性，即網路服務品質。服務需求者透過呼叫高品質之網路服務以得到更高之效益，於是網路服務的服務品質為影響分配機制之主要因素。我們參考許多已發展的服務品質理論，將服務需求者的經驗加入至我們的服務品質考量，可以為服務之品質屬性提供一個經驗式的衡量準則。
最後，將於實驗中討論在不同的市場參數設定下之整體效益值，觀察市場環境中服務需求者與提供者之行為，以得到在何種情況下之參數設定所導致之網路服務分配逼近於最佳分配之整體效益值。

Web service technique provides a platform for integration of enterprise and organizations, and each member of organizations announces their applications as web services in the network. We need a web service allocation mechanism to allocate web services to those who need it. A perfect allocation mechanism will take the benefit of service demanders and service providers into consideration, and with the ability of solving demand conflict.
To apply economic concept to distributed computing is the main idea of market. Market based mechanism is constituted by many self-interesting individualities. The individualities of market cooperate and compete with each other to reach their goal, and the market with an invisible hand will infer the complex problem to a stable result. How to make the stable result conform to our expectation depends on how we design the market.
Service demanders and service providers exist in the same intranet or distribute in distinct network. They cooperate and compete with each other like a market environment. We exploit economical theory, includes production function, combination auction, to design our price policy, reserve price setting policy and utility function etc. Once the market established, the invisible hand of market will infer the problem to our expected result: an optimal allocation.
Before design market mechanisms, we must take qualities of web services into consideration. The service demanders call high quality services to enhance their benefit, such that the quality of web service is the most important effecting metric of allocation mechanism design. We refer to previous research and take users feedback into QoS consideration to develop our QoS metrics.

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