摘要

本文第一章探討廠商可以選擇組織型態同時面對勞動市場競爭與代理問題的最適組織選擇問題。不同的組織型態可以帶給廠商在執行計畫結束後，不同程度的勞工生產力訊息。垂直整合廠商可以觀察到失敗的員工是否為具生產力的員工。另一種組織形式，外包廠商，則無法得到這樣的訊息。不同組織型態的廠商可以透過這個訊息或開除不合格的勞工，來調整其代理成本，進而達到最適化的結果。在特定條件之下，我們找到一個不對稱的（混和的）穩定均衡，其中部分廠商選擇垂直整合，另一部分廠商選擇外包的組織型態。傳統的部分均衡模型無法得出對稱的廠商設定下，混和的組織型態均衡。實務上，混和的組織型態才是常態，我們的一般均衡模型補足了這部份的解釋。另外，本章亦探討均衡之下的比較靜態分析。其結果顯示，當前的收益增加或勞動市場擴大，會增加均衡外包廠商的數量；而未來的廠商收益增加，則會使得較少廠商選擇外包。同時，我們也將均衡時外包廠商的數量與完全訊息解、社會最適解以及卡特爾最適解做一比較，結果發現，相對於其他狀況均衡時廠商傾向選擇較多的外包。

第二章是在Bertrand設定之下，假設生產先於定價且廠商生產成本為私人訊息，其價格競爭的分析。結果顯示如果廠商定價時無法得知對手所生產的數量，比較此模型與生產成本為私人訊息下的一般Bertrand競爭，高成本廠商定價更高，低成本廠商定價更低。這是因為，高成本廠商，由於其贏得市場的機率較低，會傾向避免支付過多的生產成本，而生產較少數量的產品，同時可以訂定較高的價格。相反地，由於低成本廠商贏得市場的機率較大，會以更低的價格來確保其能贏得市場。於是風險中立的廠商在此的行為，會類似於一般買方拍賣時，風險趨避的出價者。若市場彈性夠大，此一效果會更加明顯。當廠商定價時，可以觀察到對手所生產的數量。此時，我們的結果與 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)相同，廠商會在一開始生產（Bayesian-）Cournot均衡的數量，而其訂定的價格也等於Cournot數量加總下的市場價格。

Chapter 1 provides a model that firms not only choose mode of organization but also deals with agency problem and the competitive equilibrium in labor market. Firm's choice of the mode of organization is defined by his ability to acquire the information of worker's productivity. Also, firm fires the failed worker according to that information and the benefit and cost of rehiring a new worker from the market. Under certain conditions, an asymmetric equilibrium exists where some firms use outsourcing and the others use integration. The mixed mode in equilibrium explains the phenomenon that firms choose different modes of organizations in a symmetric setting. Furthermore, comparative statics shows that the mixed equilibrium is increasing in revenue of project at the first period and the number of worker and decreasing in the revenue of project at the second period. We also compare the equilibrium result to the solutions to the social planner and cartel optimization and demonstrate a general over-outsourcing pattern.

In chapter 2, we construct a model that firms compete as Bertrand but they provide their products in advance. In the model, the firm's cost is privately known. We show that if firms are unable to observe the quantities the other firms made when they are setting price, low-cost firms will price more aggressively and high-cost firms will price higher than the firms in the market that production after naming the price. Moreover, a market with more elastic demand amplify this effect.

When the firms can observe the quantities their rivals made, the outcome is changed dramatically. The market equilibrium will be consistent with the Cournot outcome, though firms compete for market share in Bertrand game. This is a similar result to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Leopore (2008). The difference between our model and theirs is the rationing rule for pricing competition. In the literature, they construct a complex rationing rule to deal with the problem of residual demand. Here, we use the winner-take-all rule to simplify the model and provide a Cournot outcome in the Bertrand game settings with rival's cost unknown.

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