在排放權交易制度中，廠商可選擇買進排放權或進行防治設備投資來完成污染減量目標，但因某些設備在投資上具有不可回復性，故當這些設備一旦安裝就不易被拆除的情形下，排放權價格訊息則成為廠商是否安裝減量排放設備的重要指標。本研究將以台灣高屏地區的廠商資料為例，建立社會決策者以及廠商決策兩個模型，利用混合型整數的非線性規劃方法，將廠商機器設備投資具有不可回復的特性納入模型中，以此探討不同的價格訊息將對廠商的減量排放設備投資及整體交易市場將產生何種影響。
本研究以高屏地區NOX排放大於30公噸的廠商為對象，並以2007年的排放資料為基準，模擬10%、15%以及30%的污染減量管制。社會決策者模型模擬結果顯示，在這三種管制標準之下，整體社會的總減量成本分別68.93(百萬元)、103.81(百萬元)以及210.13(百萬元)，在所有產業中，電力供應業一直為排放減量最多的產業，而鋼鐵冶煉業則為市場中最大的需求者。而由廠商決策模型發現，決策變數的不連續特性導致交易市場在這三種管制標準下，皆不會有均衡產生，以10％管制為例，若政府之目標為追求市場能最接近均衡，則應釋出的價格訊息為每公噸11,364元到11,392元，在此價格訊息區間下，市場雖有超額供給現象，但卻可達成環境管制目標，故若環境品質的改善提升是政府的第一要務，則應釋放出較高的價格訊息，誘使廠商多裝設防治設備，使市場中有超額供給發生，但因過度的設備投資也可能造成資源的浪費，故政府可在考慮市場中的超額供給以及超額需求所帶來的成本與效益後，更審慎來決定應釋放何種價格訊息。

Under tradable pollution permit system, firms can decide whether or not to install new control equipment to achieve the reduction targets. Therefore, sending the right price signals could help firms make decisions concerning whether to adopt technology or to buy permits. By incorporating technology adoption as a Yes/No binary variable, this research develops an optimization framework analyzing how control agencies can search out appropriate price signals to enhance overall efficiency in the trading market. In this study, we will construct two optimization models, so called the “social planner’s model” and the “firm level model” to investigate how tradable pollution permit system may affect firms’ investment decisions in Kaoshiung and Pingtung areas.
The results show that if the government require firms to reduce total NOX emissions by 10%、15% and 30% from the year 2007 levels, the total regulation costs would be $68.93 million,103.81 million and 210.13 million. The electricity generating industry always plays a major role in pollution reduction and is the largest supplier in the market. However, no equilibrium can be found in these scenarios. Under the 10% regulation, the price range that is closest to the equilibrium condition is from $11,364 to$11,392 per ton. Although there exists excess supply within the price range, the reduction target is achieved. Therefore, if promoting environmental quality is the prime task, the government should release a higher price signal to enhance firm’s incentive for installing new control equipment. However, the excess supply of permit from over investment might be viewed as inefficiency. The government should consider the cost and benefit from excess demand and excess supply in the market before deciding what price signals should be sent.

一、中文部分
(一)專書
1.行政院環保署：〈環境保護25年回顧與展望〉，(行政院環保署，2012年)。
2.羅時芳：〈碳排放交易制度國際經驗與成效檢討之研究〉，(中華經濟研究院，2011年2月)。

(二)期刊論文
1.吳珮瑛、林宗昱：〈由APEC 區域組織邁入國際社會參與碳排放交易之結果—對台灣的啟示〉，《台灣國際研究季刊》，6卷1期(2010)，頁143-84。
2.黃宗煌、李堅明：〈排放交易、廠商最適投資決策及經濟成長〉，《農業經濟半年刊》，70期(2001)。
3.黃宗煌、李堅明、莊富欽：〈廠商在排放交易制度下之污防性投資與創新行為〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，35:1 (2007)，頁 87-114。
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(三)研討會論文
1.曾瓊瑤、李堅明：〈哥本哈根氣候協議與台灣參與國際排放交易之經濟影響評估〉，2010第十一屆全國實證經濟學研討會，輔仁大學，台北。

(四)研究報告
1.朱信(1999)。「氮氧化物控制技術、效率及成本資料調查分析」。行政院環境保護署。
2.劉錦添(1991)。「環境保護政策之經濟分析—中美日環境保護政策與措施之研究」。行政院經濟建設委員會。
3.廖肇寧 (2004)。「高屏空品區污染排放權交易之經濟分析」。行政院國家科學委員會。
4.周麗芳、陳香梅、林良楓、高立箴、李堅明(2011)。「因應低碳與綠色成長之排放交易制度建置研究—因應低碳與綠色成長之排放交易制度建置研究」。行政院國家科學委員會。

(五)學位論文
1.張村品：〈高高屏地區試行空氣污染排放權交易之市場分析〉，國立成功大學政治經濟學研究所碩士論文，2004。
2.蔡其融：〈空氣污染排放權交易之經濟分析-以高高屏地區總懸浮微粒管制為例〉，國立清華大學經濟學研究所碩士論文，2011。

二、英文部分
(一)專書
1.Dales, J. H., Pollution, Property and Prices, (Toronto: University Press, 1968).
2.Siegfried, J. J., Better Living Through Economics, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010).
3.Tietenberg, T., Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice, (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, c2006.).
4.Tietenberg, T., Environmental Economics and Policy, (Boston: Addison-Wesley, c2010.).

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