信念、欲望等心理態度具有心理內容。不同的心理態度可以透過其在行動系統中扮演的推論角色來加以刻畫，然而心理內容是由什麼樣的事實來決定呢？心理內容的外在論主張，一個思想者的心理內容並非完全由思想者本身的種種條件所決定、而是部分地由思想者之外的環境因素所決定。這個主張似乎威脅到了自我知識的觀念。自我知識是指一思想者對其擁有的心理內容具有直接的、非推論性的掌握。表面上看來，如果外在論為真，一思想者若要知道自己的心理內容為何，似乎必須要先知道決定此內容的環境因素；但由於思想者不能夠對其環境具有直接、非推論性的知識，思想者似乎就無法對自己的心理內容有直接的、非推論性的掌握。內容外在論與自我知識觀念是否相容的問題，引起許多的討論。這個問題牽涉到說明心理內容的決定因素、語言意義與命題態度的關係、自我知識的解釋模型、外在論與自我知識的認知地位的關係、自我知識的認知保證來自何處、記憶的性質為何、批判推理與自我知識之間的關係、一個理性思想者的認知權利與認知責任何在…等一系列的哲學問題。
博之(Tyler Burge)對於內容外在論與自我知識的觀念提出許多重要的看法。他主張心理內容部分是由思想者之外的社會脈絡與物理性質所決定的，並提出基本自我知識的觀念，說明外在論與自我知識觀念兩者是完全相容的。然而在另一方面，戴維森(Donald Davidson)、麥肯錫(Michael McKinsey)與伯侯申(Paul Boghossian)等人則根據不同的理由，指出博之的外在論與自我知識的觀念是不相容的。本文以博之的外在論作為切入點來探討這個問題，並且試圖替博之提出辯護，回應上述三人所提出的反對意見。透過這些問題的討論，我們可以發現引起『外在論與自我知識是否相容？』這個哲學問題的癥結所在；而透過對這些癥結點的釐清以及替博之所提出的辯護，我們要顯示出外在論與自我知識兩者沒有不相容之處。

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