我試著用諾以所發展的行動知覺進路，來檢視莫里內問題。此進路的基本主張是：只有感官刺激不足以讓主體獲得知覺經驗，必須擁有及行使感覺運動知識，才可能形成知覺經驗。反轉鏡片實驗和頭部以下癱瘓病人的例子，可以作為經驗證據，來支持行動知覺進路的主張。

行動知覺進路也主張，每個感官模態都由對應的感覺運動知識掌管。而觸覺模態和視覺模態的感覺運動知識，在抽象的層次上是同構的。諾以用此為理由，肯定回答莫里內問題。本論文也要指出，諾以版本的肯定回答，並不是說復明者能立即指認眼前的方塊和球體。他做了適度讓步：復明者必須學習視覺感覺運動知識才能進行指認。在莫里內問題的檢視下，諾以理論最大的價值，在於提出視覺能夠「直接」獲得空間形狀經驗，並和之前的觸覺空間形狀經驗對應上。

筆者也要論證：觸覺和視覺感覺運動知識之所以具有同構性，是因為「主體已經擁有且只有一個行動空間」。行動知覺進路隱含著伊凡斯行動空間理論，否則行動知覺進路不會成立。我也要說明，雖然諾以和伊凡斯都對莫里內問題持肯定答覆，但伊凡斯的理論不足以讓他提供肯定的回答，並指出為什麼諾以是對的。

莫里內問題可以區分為理論性和經驗性。筆者試圖指出，移除白內障使患者復明的實驗，不是驗證莫里內經驗性問題的好方式。目前只有在嬰兒身上做的實驗，才能支持莫里內經驗性問題的答案「很可能」是肯定的。但是諾以的理論和嬰兒實驗證據有所衝突，筆者也要論證：這種衝突可以藉由修正諾以的理論來解消。

My aim in this MA thesis is to reconsider Molyneux’s question which was originally proposed by John Locke in 1689. I intend to use enactive approach’s key concepts developed by Alva Noë to reexamine this issue. The basic claim of enactive approach is that sensory stimulation alone is not sufficient to produce perceptual experience. Human subject can acquire perceptual experience only if they possess and exercise sensorimotor knowledge.

Noë also argued that every sensory modality of human subject is governed by its own corresponding sensorimotor knowledge. At an appropriate level of abstraction, tactile and visual sensorimotor knowledge are isomorphic to each other. This is a key reason for Noë to give a positive answer to Molyneux’s question. However, according to my interpretation, Noë’s assertion is not qualified to claim that the newly-sighted person can identify immediately an object whether it is a cube or a sphere.

Noë’s answer is subjected to certain important qualifications: the newly-sighted person has to move or being moved in order to learn sensorimotor knowledge of vision. Noë’s contribution to this question is that he asserts vision can directly acquire spatial experience like touch does, and that the spatial content which vision acquire has inner connection to the previous tactile experience.

I try to argue that tactile and visual sensorimotor knowledge are isomorphism, because the subject already has one and only has one behavioral space. Enactive approach implicitly contains the theory of behavioral space developed by Gareth Evans. I also maintain that although both Noë and Evans answered Molyneux’s question positively, Evans’s theory do not support a positive answer. In contrast, Noë’s theory does.

Molyneux’s question has two aspects: theoretical one and experiential one. I try to indicate that the result of experiment which removed cataract to restore sight cannot offer a negative answer to the experiential question. I claim that only the experiment on infants can prove that the answer to Molyneux’s question is probably “Yes”. But apparently there exists a conflict between the evidence from infants and Noë’s theory. I show that we can modify Noë’s theory to mitigate this conflict.

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