本論文之主旨為以訊息經濟的理論觀點為出發點，來研究探討捐官制度對於政府選才的影響，並藉由其與考試制度的比較討論，來說明加入捐官制度後的選才機制是否在人才錄取上較為完備。

研究結果發現，捐官制度對於政府在選才上的確有所助益，補足了在考試制度下無法錄取到低考試能力但高做事能力人才的缺憾。最後，希望能以本研究的結論，提供對這個議題有興趣的人士參考。

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