How Time Pressure, Expertise, Risk Preference, Endowment and Dissonance Condition Influence the Investment-Decision Pattern

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研究生：	賴興國 Lai Hsing-Kuo
論文名稱：	How Time Pressure, Expertise, Risk Preference, Endowment and Dissonance Condition Influence the Investment-Decision Pattern
指導教授：	蕭中強 Hsiao Chung-Chiang
口試委員:
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	科技管理學院 - 科技管理研究所 Institute of Technology Management
論文出版年：	2005
畢業學年度：	93
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	129
中文關鍵詞：	Investment-decision pattern 、Time pressure 、Expertise 、Risk preference 、Endowment 、Dissonance condition 、Exchange options
外文關鍵詞：	Investment-decision pattern, Time pressure, Expertise, Risk preference, Endowment, Dissonance condition, Exchange options
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Abstract
Taiwan recently opened up financial restrictions, resulting in an expansion of the financial market. Furthermore, as financial engineering provides more and more financial products, investors may not be satisfied by the traditional products, such as the certificate of deposit and stocks. Investors may become interested in innovative financial products, such as futures, options and derivatives. Nevertheless, it is still an open argument as to how investors decide the amount of first investment for innovative financial product? When they encounter dissonance condition, how do investors adjust the amount of investment? How do investors decide the amount of next investment, especially when the profit is zero for the last investment?
Prospect theory presents a critique of expected utility theory and indicates that investors are not full-rational when making decisions under risk. Following the same line of research, this study examines investor’s investment-decision pattern that contains three investment models. These models are the first investment model, the adjustment investment model and the next investment model. Five important factors have been demonstrated that have significant interactive effect to influence the investment-decision pattern. These factors are time pressure, expertise, risk preference, endowment and dissonance condition.
In order to simulate the sense of reality, we arbitrarily introduce exchange options as investing targets for investors. The findings can be generalized to any other financial products with similar characteristics as the exchange options particularly designed in this study. Besides, the skills of web questionnaire design are utilized to manipulate time pressure, dissonance condition and avoid subjects coming back prior pages to alter decisions. These characters are different from paper questionnaire.
For business contributions, time pressure has been demonstrated that significantly influences investors to make decision under risk. Hence, the verified hypotheses can be utilized by financial institutes for marketing. For academic contributions, five ways interactive effect has been demonstrated that significantly influences the decision of the amount of next investment. These interactive factors are time pressure, expertise, risk preference, endowment and dissonance condition.

Keywords:
Investment-decision pattern; Time pressure; Expertise; Risk preference; Endowment; Dissonance condition; Exchange options

Contents
1. Introduction    1
1.1 The Motives of this Study    1
1.2 The Purposes of this Study    2
1.3 The Uniqueness of this Study    4
1.3.1 Experimental Design    4
1.3.2 Psychology Consideration    5
1.3.3 Web Questionnaire Design    5
2. Theoretical Background    7
2.1 Consumer Behavior    7
2.1.1 Overview of Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)    7
2.1.2 Overview of Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM)    9
2.1.3 Involvement    10
2.1.4 Innovation-Decision Process    11
2.1.5 Time Pressure    11
2.2 Prospect Theory    12
2.2.1 The Reference Point    12
2.2.2 The Value Function    13
2.2.3 Prospect Theory and Risk Preference    14
2.3 Financial Engineering    15
2.3.1 Exchange Options    16
2.3.2 The Pricing Model of Exchange Options    16
3. Research Models    18
3.1 The Investment-Decision Pattern    18
3.2 The First Investment Model    22
3.2.1 The Variables of the First Investment Model    23
3.2.2 The Hypothesis of the First Investment Model    25
3.3 The Adjustment Investment Model    29
3.3.1 The Variables of the Adjustment Investment Model    31
3.3.2 The Hypothesis of the Adjustment Investment Model    33
3.4 The Next Investment Model    43
3.4.1 The Variables of the Next Investment Model    44
3.4.2 The Hypothesis of the Next Investment Model    46
4. Research Method    56
4.1 Experiment Design    56
4.2 Web Questionnaire Design    58
4.2.1 The purposes for each page    58
4.2.2 The process of web questionnaire    60
4.2.3 The uniqueness of web questionnaire design    61
5. Results and Discussions    66
5.1 Sample Structure Analysis    66
5.1.1 Demographic Statistics    66
5.1.2 The statistics of independent variables    67
5.2 Hypotheses Examinations    74
5.2.1 for the First Investment Model    74
5.2.2 for the Adjustment Investment Model    78
5.2.3 for the Next Investment Model    91
5.3 Discussions    111
6. Contributions and Limitations    118
6.1 Contributions    118
6.1.1 for Business    118
6.1.2 for Academic    121
6.2 Limitations    122
References    124
Appendix A: Web Questionnaire    I
A-1: Instruction    I
A-2: Risk Preference Test    II
A-3: Product Information    III
A-4-1: Persuasion (No Time Limitation)    IV
A-4-2: Persuasion (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    V
A-5-1: Asset Endowment (No Time Limitation)    VI
A-5-2: Asset Endowment (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    VI
A-5-3: Debt Endowment (No Time Limitation)    VII
A-5-4: Debt Endowment (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    VII
A-6-1 Dissonance Condition: Boom (No Time Limitation)    VIII
A-6-2 Dissonance Condition: Boom (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    IX
A-6-3 Dissonance Condition: Slump (No Time Limitation)    X
A-6-4 Dissonance Condition: Slump (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    XI
A-7-1 Zero Gain (No Time Limitation)    XII
A-7-2 Zero Gain (Time Limitation: 60 Sec)    XIII
A-8 Financial Knowledge Test    XIV
A-9: Thank Subject    XV
Invalid Questionnaire (Exceed 60 Sec)    XV
Invalid Questionnaire (Exceed 10 Min)    XV
Appendix B: The Explanation Power Check    XVI
B-1: The explanation power check for the evaluation difference    XVII
B-2: The explanation power check for the amount of adjustment investment    XVIII
Appendix C: The Full Model Results    XXI
C-1: The full model results of the first evaluation, time pressure, endowment, expertise and risk preference for the amount of first investment    XXI
C-2: The full model results of the amount of first investment, time pressure, expertise and dissonance condition for the evaluation difference    XXI
C-3: The full model results of the amount of first investment, the evaluation difference, endowment, risk preference and dissonance condition for the amount of adjustment investment    XXII
C-4: The full model results of the amount of last investment, time pressure, endowment, expertise, risk preference and dissonance condition for the amount of next investment    XXII

Figures
Figure 2-1：A hypothetical value function    13
Figure 3-1：Innovation-decision process    18
Figure 3-2：The first investment model    23
Figure 3-3：The adjustment investment model    31
Figure 3-4：The rational and irrational condition of investors    35
Figure 3-5：The adjustment investment model    44
Figure 4-1：The process of web questionnaire    60
Figure 4-2：Manipulate the time pressure    62
Figure 4-3：Manipulate the dissonance condition    63
Figure 4-4：Avoid subjects idling or searching other information    64
Figure 4-5：Confirm identification of subjects    65
Figure 5-1：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (Negative endowment in the first investment model)    77
Figure 5-2：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (Positive endowment in the first investment model)    77
Figure 5-3：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (Novice in the first investment model)    78
Figure 5-4：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (Boom condition in the adjustment investment model)    85
Figure 5-5：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (Slump condition in the adjustment investment model)    86
Figure 5-6：The pattern of endowment and risk preference (Boom condition in the adjustment investment model)    88
Figure 5-7：The pattern of endowment and risk preference (Slump condition in the adjustment investment model)    89
Figure 5-8：The pattern of dissonance condition and endowment (Risk lover in the adjustment investment model)    90
Figure 5-9：The pattern of dissonance condition and endowment (Risk averter in the adjustment investment model)    91
Figure 5-10：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk averter, positive endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    94
Figure 5-11：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk averter, positive endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    94
Figure 5-12：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk averter, negative endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    95
Figure 5-13：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk averter, negative endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    96
Figure 5-14：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk lover, positive endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    97
Figure 5-15：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk lover, positive endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    97
Figure 5-16：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk lover, negative endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    98
Figure 5-17：The pattern of time pressure and expertise (In the case of risk lover, negative endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    99
Figure 5-18：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of expert, positive endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    100
Figure 5-19：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of expert, positive endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    101
Figure 5-20：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of expert, negative endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    101
Figure 5-21：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of expert, negative endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    102
Figure 5-22：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of novice, positive endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    103
Figure 5-23：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of novice, positive endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    103
Figure 5-24：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of novice, negative endowment, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    104
Figure 5-25：The pattern of time pressure and risk preference (In the case of novice, negative endowment, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    105
Figure 5-26：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk averter, expert, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    106
Figure 5-27：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk averter, expert, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    107
Figure 5-28：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk averter, novice, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    107
Figure 5-29：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk averter, novice, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    108
Figure 5-30：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk lover, expert, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    109
Figure 5-31：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk lover, expert, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    109
Figure 5-32：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk lover, novice, from boom to slump in the next investment model)    110
Figure 5-33：The pattern of time pressure and endowment (In the case of risk lover, novice, from slump to boom in the next investment model)    111

Tables
Table 4-1：The characters of our experiment design    57
Table 4-2：The purposes for each page    58
Table 5-1：Demographic statistics    66
Table 5-2：The statistics of time pressure    68
Table 5-3：The statistics of expertise    69
Table 5-4：The statistics of risk preference    70
Table 5-5：The examination of expertise and risk preference    72
Table 5-6：The statistics of endowment    73
Table 5-7：The statistics of dissonance condition    74
Table 5-8：The examination result for H 1-1, H 1-2 and H 1-3    76
Table 5-9：The frequencies of rational analysis for all subjects    79
Table 5-10：The rational analysis by chi-square test for experts and novices    80
Table 5-11：The rational analysis by chi-square test for experts with no time limitation and with time limitation    82
Table 5-12：The 3-ways ANOVA results of the evaluation difference    83
Table 5-13：The 3-ways ANOVA results of the amount of adjustment investment    87
Table 5-14：The 5-ways ANOVA results of the amount of next investment    92
Table 5-15：Result for hypotheses of the first investment model    114
Table 5-16：Result for hypotheses of the adjustment investment model    114
Table 5-17：Result for hypotheses of the next investment model    115

                                

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