論文摘要

本篇論文試圖探討先驗知識如何可能的問題。傳統以來，有關對先驗知識的說明往往訴諸於理性直觀，並且認為先驗知識就是具有必然為真與經驗上不可修正之特徵的命題。然而當代逐漸對於傳統的說法感到質疑。首先，以理性直觀的說法來說明先驗的觀點，並沒有解釋為什麼先驗知識可以依賴理性直觀就獲得證成。而某些是先驗知識但卻非必然命題、或者是必然命題卻非先驗知識之反例的提出，更使得先驗知識的定義需要更仔細的釐清。有關對先驗知識的直接反對，來自於蒯因的整體論與經驗主義立場。他主張先驗知識要有可能，僅當掌握語句的同時能夠獲得真理。然而蒯因認為一個脫離事實的語句並無真假值可言。蒯因的觀點對於當代先驗知識的討論，形成一個新的討論方向。部分的哲學家放棄了以意義理論來說明先驗知識是如何可能的問題。而不放棄意義理論的哲學家，也開創出不同於傳統的意義理論，來面對蒯因的質疑。
皮卡克站在理性論的立場，提出一套可行的意義理論，來說明先驗知識是依賴於什麼樣的一種理性認知，而獲得證成的。他認為意義的最小單位是概念，而掌握概念就是掌握概念的掌握條件。掌握條件是一個掌握概念的思考者，掌握一概念時所掌握到之認知意涵的說明。用他的話來說，構成概念掌握條件的是一個思考者掌握一概念所會具有的判斷傾向。一個掌握概念的思考者，不僅掌握了此概念的認知意涵，還掌握到此概念的語意值。也就是說，皮卡克的意義理論，並沒有像蒯因批評的，會與世界沒有關連而無法決定真假值。由於掌握概念就在於掌握到概念所帶有的認知意涵，並且概念所包含的認知意涵將幫助思考者掌握到概念的指涉。因此，一個掌握命題的思考者可以在掌握命題的同時，獲知命題的真值條件。而在一些條件的配合下，一個思考者是有可能僅僅憑著對概念的掌握而同時獲知該命題為真的。先驗知識之所以可能，就在於思考者掌握命題時，能夠掌握到命題所包含之概念所帶有的豐富認知資訊使然。

關鍵字：先驗知識、概念理論、理性論、蒯因、先驗性、證成關係、先驗真理

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中文資料
吳瑞媛，〈論偽思想〉，台灣哲學學會2003年年會暨學術研討會，會議論文。