論文摘要

二次世界大戰後，為有效管理累積的財政盈餘與外匯存底，許多國家紛紛設立主權財富基金 (Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWFs)，以促進財富增值並實現跨世代財富轉移。至今，主權財富基金已成為全球經濟的重要角色，管理資產規模超過12兆美元。然而，主權財富基金的運營也面臨諸多挑戰，包括透明度不足、外部政治壓力、經濟風險以及如何平衡國家戰略目標與財務收益等問題。本研究旨在探討台灣設立主權財富基金的可行性與對策，通過對全球主要主權財富基金的運作模式、成功經驗與國際實踐的比較分析，為台灣提供政策建議。
本文首先探討了主權財富基金的歷史發展與基本定義，並根據國際貨幣基金組織 (International Monetary Fund, IMF) 的分類，將主權財富基金劃分為穩定基金、儲蓄基金、外匯投資公司、發展基金與退休準備基金等類型。主權財富基金的資金來源主要包括國際收支盈餘、政府財政盈餘與自然資源收入等，並根據其目標的不同在國內外資本市場中進行多樣化投資。本文還引用了「聖地亞哥原則」(Santiago Principles)，強調透明度與問責制對基金治理的重要性，並將其作為主權財富基金的最佳實踐框架。
接下來，本文透過案例分析，深入探討四個全球典型主權財富基金的運營模式與成效：挪威的「全球養老金基金」(GPFG)、阿布達比的「阿布達比投資局」、「穆巴達拉投資公司」、「阿布達比控股公司」(ADIA、MIC、ADQ)、中國的「中國投資有限責任公司」(CIC) 與新加坡的「政府投資公司」(GIC)。研究發現，挪威GPFG 以其高透明度與長期穩健的投資策略著稱，其資金來源於石油稅收，並採取分散投資原則，將多數資產配置於國際股票市場，實現了平均年回報率6%以上的卓越表現。ADIA、ADQ、MIC 則憑藉中東豐富的石油資源，通過靈活的全球投資擴大影響力；中國CIC 利用強大的外匯存底進行全球資產配置；新加坡GIC 在亞洲地區以其專業治理能力和穩健回報備受矚目。
在實證分析部分，本文基於全球百大主權財富基金的相關政經數據進行迴歸分析，揭示了幾項關鍵自變數對主權財富基金規模與運營模式的顯著影響。結果顯示，「外匯存底占GDP比例」與「國債占GDP比例」分別與主權財富基金的規模呈正向與反向關係，顯示外匯存底相對充裕的國家更具設立大型基金的基礎，而國債比重較高則明顯地抑制基金規模的擴大。此外，「資金是否來自自然資源型經濟」對基金規模則具有高且明顯的解釋力，顯示資源型經濟國家通常更傾向於設立主權基金管理盈餘財富，以達成財富世代轉移的使命。另一發現則是民主指數與財務透明度對主權財富基金規模有較為複雜的交互作用，透明度高的基金通常能實現更穩定的回報，並減少外部政治壓力。同時，透明度與國家民主程度之間存在交互作用，民主指數較高且透明度高的國家，往往在基金財務與治理及資產管理方面表現更為優異。
針對台灣的情境，本文分析了當前中央銀行外匯存底的運營模式及政府基金的管理現況，台灣現下擁有在全球名列前茅的外匯存底規模，的確具備了設立主權財富基金的基礎條件。然而，主要挑戰包括現行法規與監管架構不足、潛在的運營風險 (如政治干涉與道德風險) 以及在地緣政治壓力下維持基金獨立性。而且台灣目前已存在多檔政府公營基金正在運作，其資產總額與投資收益對比於全球各國之主權基金而言並不遑多讓。本文建議，台灣政府如若欲成立國家主權財富基金，除可借鑑他國的成功經驗，採取「專業治理結合分散投資」的策略，並將主權財富基金的運作機構設置為獨立於中央銀行以外的單位，以確保透明與問責，亦維護了中央銀行其超然宏觀調控立場而非逐利的角色。同時，台灣中央政府或可透過發行公債集資換匯來利用小部份的外匯存底，投資於策略性產業、關鍵技術與創新領域，以提升國家競爭力並應對未來不確定性。然而，成功的基金運營需要政府、立法機構與專業投資管理者的緊密合作，並制定完善的治理框架，確保基金在穩健與透明的基礎上運行。

關鍵詞 : 主權財富基金、中央銀行、外匯存底、迴歸分析

Abstract

After World War II, many countries established Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to effectively manage accumulated fiscal surpluses and foreign exchange reserves. These funds aim to enhance wealth growth and achieve intergenerational wealth transfer. Today, SWFs play a vital role in the global economy, managing assets exceeding $12 trillion. However, their operations face significant challenges, including insufficient transparency, external political pressures, economic risks, and the need to balance national strategic goals with financial returns. This study explores the feasibility and strategies for Taiwan to establish an SWF, providing policy recommendations through a comparative analysis of the operational models, successful practices, and international experiences of major SWFs worldwide.
The paper begins by exploring the historical development and basic definitions of SWFs. Following the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification, SWFs are categorized into stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds. The primary sources of SWF funding include balance-of-payments surpluses, fiscal surpluses, and natural resource revenues. Depending on their objectives, SWFs engage in diversified investments in domestic and international capital markets. The paper also references the Santiago Principles, emphasizing the importance of transparency and accountability in fund governance and presenting them as a best-practice framework for SWFs.
Following, the study conducts case analyses of four globally representative SWFs to examine their operational models and outcomes: Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), Abu Dhabi’s Investment Authority (ADIA), Mubadala Investment Company, and Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company (ADQ), China Investment Corporation (CIC), and Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation (GIC). The analysis reveals that Norway’s GPFG is distinguished by its high transparency and long-term stable investment strategy, funded by oil tax revenues and adhering to diversification principles. Most of its assets are allocated to international equities, achieving an average annual return exceeding 6%. ADIA, ADQ, and Mubadala leverage the Middle East’s abundant oil resources to expand global influence through flexible investment approaches. CIC utilizes substantial foreign exchange reserves for global asset allocation, while GIC excels in Asia with its professional governance and stable returns.
In the empirical analysis, the study uses regression analysis of political and economic data from the world’s top 100 SWFs to identify key independent variables significantly affecting SWF size and operational models. Results show that the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP is positively correlated with SWF size, while the ratio of national debt to GDP is negatively correlated. This indicates that countries with abundant foreign exchange reserves are better positioned to establish large SWFs, whereas high debt levels constrain fund growth. Additionally, whether a country’s funds originate from a resource-based economy is a strong predictor of fund size, as resource-rich countries are more inclined to establish SWFs to manage surplus wealth and achieve intergenerational transfer. Another critical finding is the complex interaction between democracy indices and financial transparency. Funds with high transparency tend to achieve more stable returns and face less external political pressure. Furthermore, transparency and democratic governance interact positively, as countries with higher democracy indices and transparency levels generally perform better in financial governance and asset management.
By the context of Taiwan, the study analyzes the current operational model of its foreign exchange reserves and the management of government funds. It finds that Taiwan possesses one of the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, providing a strong foundation for establishing an SWF. However, significant challenges include inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks, potential operational risks, and maintaining fund independence amid geopolitical pressures. Moreover, Taiwan already manages several government-run public funds whose total assets and investment returns are comparable to global SWFs. The study recommends that if Taiwan seeks to establish a national SWF, it should draw on successful international practices by adopting a strategy of "professional governance combined with diversified investment." The operational body for Taiwan's SWF should be independent of the central bank to ensure transparency and accountability while preserving the central bank’s role as a neutral macroeconomic regulator rather than a profit-seeking entity. Additionally, Taiwan’s central government could consider issuing bonds to convert a portion of its foreign exchange reserves into investments in strategic industries, critical technologies, and innovative sectors to enhance national competitiveness and address future uncertainties. Successful fund operations would require close collaboration among the government, legislative bodies, and professional investment managers, as well as the establishment of a comprehensive governance framework to ensure the fund operates stably and transparently.

Key words : Sovereign Wealth Funds；Central Bank；Foreign Exchange Reserves；Regression Analysis

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