不管是倫理學界還是一般大眾，多半會認為凡是道德所要求的事項，僅因為道德如此要求我們，我們就有理由去從事道德要求。然而，這怎麼可能？為什麼在行為者並不關心道德時，他仍然有理由去從事道德要求？倫理學家對此嘗試進行解釋，如付諸道德乃理性之要求，或者嘗試論證，若從事道德要求，將能實現具有巨大價值之事物。然而道德要求所具有的一項特質，是以上諸般回應所無法解釋的，即若有人未能完成道德要求，我們不僅僅能夠指出他所犯的錯誤，還能夠進一步地要求、命令他完成，若未能完成，還能對他進行處罰。我將此稱作「他人可究責性」。Stephen Darwall　這位倫理學者嘗試解釋此項特性如何可能。而本文即對他的道德觀之介紹以及討論，即所謂的「第二人道德觀」。

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