本論文聚焦於南施·卡特萊特（Nancy Cartwright）的「定域實在論」（local realism），探討她對休謨（David Hume）以降的因果懷疑論之回應。休謨透過將因果性化約為事件之間的恆常連結，深刻影響了科學解釋在邏輯實證主義與「涵蓋律模型」（covering law model）下的發展。然而，涵蓋律模型難以充分處理開放系統與背景條件多變等情境，也無法解釋科學家如何透過實驗設計與因果推論來掌握更深層的因果知識。
卡特萊特提出的定域實在論，主張科學定律的適用有賴「儲能」（capacity）在特定條件下的顯現，以及「定律機器」（nomological machine）在封閉系統中排除干擾、重複產生穩定規律。她透過此概念成功批判休謨式規律論對科學定律普遍性的假定，並展現科學知識在不同脈絡下的情境依賴性。然而，「儲能」概念同時面臨形上學一致性、普遍性與單一性間的張力；結構實在論者也質疑，是否應改以「事物間的結構關係」取代「儲能」來解釋因果機制。
為了進一步回應這些批評，本研究借鏡巴斯卡（Roy Bhaskar）的批判實在論與實在分層理論，嘗試在多層次的本體框架中修正並補強卡特萊特的「儲能—因果結構」架構。本文主張，將「儲能」置於分層的實在觀點下，可以更穩固地解釋為何因果關係能在多變情境下維持穩定性與可重複性，也能兼顧科學家在設計實驗與進行因果推論時的操作實務。如此一來，既能回應反實在論者對「儲能」的質疑，也能與結構實在論互補，強調跨情境的穩定性與事物本性／結構間的平衡。
綜觀而言，本論文的貢獻主要在於：
1. 重構卡特萊特的定域實在論對休謨因果懷疑論的回應，凸顯「儲能」在科學解釋與定律本質中的地位。
2. 透過對巴斯卡批判實在論的比較與整合，提出多層次形上學圖像，以緩解「儲能」在普遍性與單一性之間的理論張力。
3. 提供一種兼具實踐與形上視野的分析框架，並就未來科學實踐的因果解釋與實在論議題，提出更具包容力的可能路徑。
本研究期待透過這樣的分析，促進科學哲學對「休謨以來的因果挑戰」有更深入的省思。卡特萊特以「定律機器」與「儲能」為核心概念，藉此來解釋科學家如何在複雜多變的情境中，建構穩定而具連貫性的因果解釋，也為當代哲學及跨領域的對話，開拓了新的契機與發展方向。

This thesis focuses on Nancy Cartwright’s local realism and explores her response to David Hume’s causal skepticism. Hume’s view, which reduces causality to constant conjunction between events, profoundly shaped scientific explanation in the context of logical positivism and the covering law model. However, the covering law model struggles to adequately handle open systems and diverse background conditions, and it falls short in explaining how scientists use experimental design and causal inference to grasp deeper causal knowledge.
Cartwright’s local realism argues that the applicability of scientific laws depends on the manifestation of “capacities” under specific conditions, as well as the operation of “nomological machines” in enclosed systems to eliminate interference and repeatedly generate stable regularities. By adopting this view, she effectively challenges the Humean assumption of the universal scope of laws and highlights the contextual dependence of scientific knowledge in different settings. Yet, her notion of “capacity” faces tensions concerning metaphysical consistency, universality, and singularity. Structural realists also question whether “capacities” should be replaced by an emphasis on the relational structure between entities.
To address these criticisms, this study draws on Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism and his theory of stratified reality, aiming to modify and reinforce Cartwright’s “capacity–causal structure” framework within a multi-layered ontological context. It is argued that situating “capacity” within a stratified view of reality provides a stronger explanation of how causal relations maintain stability and repeatability across varied contexts, while simultaneously accounting for how scientists operate experimentally and conduct causal reasoning. In this way, the criticisms posed by anti-realists are effectively addressed, and the approach also complements structural realism, underscoring cross-context stability and a balanced interplay between the essence and structure of phenomena.
Overall, the chief contributions of this thesis lie in:
1. Reconstructing how Cartwright’s local realism responds to Hume’s causal skepticism, thereby highlighting the role of “capacities” in scientific explanation and the nature of laws.
2. Leveraging Bhaskar’s critical realism to propose a multi-layered metaphysical perspective that alleviates the theoretical tension around the universality vs. singularity of “capacities.”
3. Offering an analytical framework that integrates both practical and metaphysical insights, and suggesting more inclusive potential pathways for scientific practice in causal explanation and issues of scientific realism.
Through this analysis, the present study hopes to further invigorate philosophical debates on “the challenge of Humean causality” by demonstrating how Cartwright’s “nomological machines” and “capacities” can be used to explain how scientists construct stable and coherent causal explanations in complex and ever-shifting contexts. This, in turn, opens new avenues and opportunities for dialogue in contemporary philosophy and interdisciplinary research.

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中文參考文獻
陳思廷
2010. 〈以起因結構為基礎的經濟理論構作之分析：從經濟學家的實作面向看。〉《政治與社會哲學評論》 33: 97-168。
〈儲能與因果結構論〉，《華文哲學百科》。