德性倫理學主張說，一個行為是對的，當且僅當，那是有德之士在那個情況下會做的事。為何有德之士總是會做出對的行為呢？因為他對於一件事情有正確的看法。本篇論文以德性倫理學者約翰‧麥克道爾的觀點來刻劃有德之士之獨特的認知觀點。麥克道爾將美德定義為知識，亦即，一種「認識到情況對行為之要求」的知覺能力。雖然有德之士的道德知識不可條文化成一條條原則，但是有德之士仍然可以透過一個人應該如何活著的知識與個別情況的知識之間的互動，掌握行為理由，並做出正確可靠的判斷。有德之士做出對的行為，不是因為做此行為可以滿足他的欲望或利益，而是因為他具有第二天性，他可以認識到道德理由，並遵守美德之要求。由於，道德知識無法條文化，因此使得德性倫理學受到其他規範倫理學（結果論和義務論）的批評，它們認為德性倫理學無法提供行為的指引。筆者將在內文中說明，德性倫理學如何提供行為之指引。在文章的最後，筆者將指出德性倫理學的特色：做出對的行為不是純粹理性的運作或是規則遵循的結果，做出對的行為必然地涉及了行動主體的性格、情感、習慣、人生觀等等的人性自然面向。

Virtue Ethics claims that an action is right if and only if this is what a virtuous person would do under the circumstances. Why does the virtuous person always do the right action? The virtuous person always does the right action because he gets things right. My thesis adopts the point of John McDowell to characterize the unique perception of virtuous person. McDowell defines Virtue as Knowledge; that is to say, a perceptual capacity to recognize requirement that situations impose on one’s behavior. Although moral knowledge of virtuous person cannot be codified as a principle, virtuous person recognizes the reason for action and makes right and reliable judgments through the interaction between knowledge of how to live and particular knowledge of individual situations. Virtuous person does the right action, not because doing this action fulfills his desires or benefits, but he equips the second nature through which he can recognize moral reasons and obey the requirements of virtue to do the right thing. Since the moral knowledge cannot be codified, other theories such as Normative Ethics, consequentialism and deontology criticize that Virtue Ethics cannot provide the action guide. I will explain how Virtue Ethics provides action guide in the thesis. At the last part of the thesis, I would point out the feature of Virtue Ethics: doing the right action cannot be a purely rational exercise or rule following; doing the right action must involve aspects of human nature of agent’s character, emotions, habits, outlook on life, etc.

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