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研究生： 張耕瑋
Chang, Keng-Wei
論文名稱： 人工智慧與共謀：當電腦影響動態定價
Artificial Intelligence and collusion: When computers affect dynamic pricing
指導教授： 史欽泰
Shih, Chin-Tay
王俊程
Chang, Wen-Ruey
口試委員: 李傳楷
Lee, Chuan-Kai
羅達賢
Lo, Ta-Hsien
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 科技管理學院 - 經營管理碩士在職專班
Business Administration
論文出版年： 2020
畢業學年度： 108
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 32
中文關鍵詞： 人工智慧 、共謀 、賽局理論 、電子商務 、法令
外文關鍵詞： Artificial Intelligence, Collusion, Game Theory, Ecommerce, Regulations
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    • 由於電子商務與人工智慧越來越普及，越來越多企業開始採取使用電腦自動定價取代傳統人工定價方式。儘管各公司沒有私下溝通，但是各個企業開始使用人工智慧定價時，是否有可能在企業沒有互相合作的意圖下還是有共謀的結果。
    本研究主要探討當企業採用人工智慧進行定價策略以產生共謀的可能性。本研究從賽局理論的切入，探討為何會有共謀及共謀對於消費者的影響。接著探討目前各種定價演算法的種類，最後再分析人工智慧在彼此沒有直接聯繫時，是否會產生共謀。以往共謀的方式皆會利用最新可取得的科技技術，如使用電話，電子郵件，電腦程式等等。由人工智慧驅動，剔除了”人”的干預，在這樣以機器為主的新環境下是否法令上要做任何調整呢?

    Nowadays due to ecommerce, artificial intelligence is getting more widespread, more and more firms apply computer autonomous pricing mechanism instead of traditional pricing methods. Despite there is no direct communication between the firms, there is a possibility to achieve collusion without any mutual cooperation between two firms which apply artificial intelligence pricing mechanisms,
    In this paper, the possibility of collusion is discussed when firms implement artificial intelligence pricing system. The reasons why firms wish to collude are explained and the types of different artificial intelligence algorithms are presented. When there is no direct communication between two entities with artificial intelligence the possibilities of their collusion are analyzed. It is possible that firms with artificial intelligence pricing colludes without human interaction involved. Do we need to adjust the regulation to protect the interests of consumers before it gets out of hand?

    摘要 I ABSTRACT II 謝 誌 III 目錄 IV 表目錄 VI 第壹章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究方法與範圍 2 第三節 研究架構 3 第貳章 文獻探討 4 第一節 共謀的定義 4 第二節 經濟學上共謀的誘因 7 第三節 成功共謀的關鍵因素 14 I. 競爭者多寡 14 II. 溝通的重要性 15 第參章 人工智慧共謀可能造成的危害 16 第一節 改變市場結構 17 第二節 人工智慧為撮合工具對價格影響 18 第三節 人工智慧彼此共謀 20 第肆章 演算法與機器學習 21 第一節 機器學習 22 I. 監督式學習 23 II. 非監督式學習 23 III. 強化學習 24 IV. 深度學習 25 第二節 人工智慧能學習溝通嗎? 26 第伍章 總結 27 第一節 研究發現 27 第二節 研究限制與建議 28 參考文獻 30

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