報復制度作為WTO救濟機制的最後一道防線，其規定如何，是否能有效促使會員國遵守WTO義務，關乎救濟制度之成敗。遺憾的是，經由過去幾年的實踐與發展，報復制度遭受許多的批評與要求改進的聲浪，最主要的批評在於仲裁人就授權WTO會員國進行報復之程度，過去的實踐看來似乎無法有效促使違反WTO義務之會員國立即改正其違法行為，且權利被侵害之國家基於政治經濟之現實考量往往欠缺實際實施報復之能力；然而另一方面，會員國亦有認為仲裁人在認定上過於恣意寬鬆之批評。
對於迥然不同之批評，本文試圖以國際法以外之角度切入分析，以經濟分析及契約法上效率違約理論(efficient breach theory)的角度觀察WTO的爭端解決機制，以效率的觀點觀察目前制度上是否符合經濟學上效率之要求，作為解釋現行制度優劣之依據。效率違約理論的論點主要認為一個制度應該要能夠促進社會最大的效益，如果在適當的賠償後違約是較有經濟效率之選擇，則法律制度應支持當事人違約，避免過度的賠償損害經濟效率，WTO之爭端解決機制是否有助於促進國際貿易之效率，本文認為應是判斷報復制度過輕或過重之重要指標。
本文之研究方法係以WTO爭端解決機制之規範、學者之論述以及目前WTO爭端解決機制目前九個授權報復仲裁案之實踐作為研究之方向，觀察仲裁人在決定會員國實施報復之程度上判斷之方式，並試圖分析目前之實踐是否符合經濟效率之要求。
依據研究之初步結果，本文認為現行WTO爭端解決機制事實上符合效率違約理論之精神，報復之程度以利益受剝奪或減損之會員國所受損害之程度為限，避免過重之制裁，對於授權報復金額上之程度，大抵恪守同等性或適當性之要求與限制，然而在認定方法之選擇上，則仍不免有過於恣意之傾向。另一方面，由於效率之認定仍需更精確地分析當事人利益變動之狀況，此亦有待後續研究者提出更深入之分析。

The suspension of concession or other obligation, a.k.a. retaliation, is the last resort of remedy available under WTO, and defines the overall achievement of WTO dispute resolution mechanism. Unfortunately, the practice over the last decade drew much criticisms and requests of improvements. One of the major issues is that the retaliation under WTO is not serious enough to encourage WTO Members acting in accordance with the WTO treaty obligations and DSB recommendations. Moreover, the Member states suffering from nullification or impairment caused by illegal acts are usually not possessing with the ability to put the retaliatory measure into practice. To the contrary, some Member states criticize the arbitrators for being arbitrary in their decision of retaliation cases.
Among the different criticisms, this article tries to examine and analyze in the approaches other than International Trade Law regime itself. This article tries to apply the efficient breach theory to see if the retaliation mechanism meets the economic efficiency. The gist of efficient breach theory is that a legal system should induce maximum welfare of the society. If breach is an economic efficient choice, the legal system should allow the party to breach his obligation without paying punitive penalty, and the premium could therefore being generated. This article claims that the economic efficiency should be an important criterion in judging the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.
This article reflects the studies of the current WTO dispute resolution mechanism, opinions of the WTO law scholars, and the actual practice of the DSB in several DSU 22.6 arbitration cases. Based on the studies, this article tries to explain whether the approaches applied by the arbitrators consist with the requirement of economic efficiency.
The preliminary result of the studies shows that the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is consistent with the efficient breach theory. The remedy available under WTO prevents a sanction with punitive nature by restricting the principle of equivalency and appropriateness. However, the model chosen by the arbitrators to determine the level of retaliation somehow shows a tendency of arbitrariness. This article also wishes to induce more input on the studies the economic analysis of the WTO system.

書籍：
1. 羅昌發，國際貿易法，元照出版，2000年。
2. 彭心儀，WTO服務貿易與通訊科技法律，元照出版，2005年。
3. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen 原著，溫麗琪編譯，法律經濟學，華泰文化，2003年。
4. Jeff Ferriell, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS (2d ed. LexisNexis, 2009).
5. Raj, Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE (2nd ed, Lexis Publishing 2001).
6. Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed., Aspen Publishers, 2007).
7. Robert A. Hillman, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2nd ed. West Group 2009).
8. Sherzod Shadikhodiaev, RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Kluwer Law International, 2009)

期刊文章
1. Andrew, D. Mitchell, Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, 17(5) E.J.I.L. 985 (2006).
2. Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 507 (2009).
3. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 554 (1977).
4. Chi, Carmody, Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement, 5(2) J. Int’l Eco l. 307 (2002).
5. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011).
6. David Collins, Efficient Breach, Reliance and Contract Remedies at the WTO, 43(2) J. World Trade 225 (2009)
7. Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 243 (2011).
8. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
9. Harvard Law Review Note, (In)Efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of the “Free Pass” After China's Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 602 (2011).
10. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (1999).
11. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 109.
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991 (1997).
13. Reto Malacrida, Towards Sounder and Fairer WTO Retaliation: Suggestions for Possible Additional Procedural Rules Governing Members' Preparation and Adoption of Retaliatory Measures, 42(1) J. World Trade 3 (2008).
14. Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 183 (1994).
15. Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L.Rev. 273, (1970).
16. Robert W. Staiger & Guido Tabellini, Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?, 11 Econ. & Pol. 109 (1999).
17. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
18. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439 (2006)
19. Shin-yi Peng, How Much Time Is Reasonable? -- The Arbitral Decisions Under Article 21.3(C) of the DSU, 26 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 323 .
20. Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 337 (2007).
21. Warren F. Schwartz, Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in The World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. 179 (2002)
22. 張心悌，從法律經濟分析觀點論WTO爭段解決機制，中正法學集刊，第15期，2004年。
23. 楊培侃，論WTO可控訴補貼報復措施程度之相稱性標準，收錄於「第十一屆國際經貿法學發展學術研討會論文集」，國際經貿組織暨法律研究中心叢書（十二），楊光華主編，政治大學國貿系出版，2011年。

GATT/WTO報告
1. WTO Arbitration Decision, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas —Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (9 April 1999).
2. WTO Arbitration Decision, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) - Original Complaint by the United States - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB (12 July 1999).
3. WTO Arbitration Decision, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) - Original Complaint by Canada - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS48/ARB (12 July 1999).
4. Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/RW (21 January 2000).
5. WTO Arbitration Decision, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (24 March 2000).
6. WTO, United States — Anti-dumping Act of 1916 — Recourse by Japan to Article 22.2 of the DSU, WT/DS162/18, (10 Jan. 2002).
7. WTO Arbitration Decision, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft - Recourse by Canada to Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS222/ARB (17 February 2003).
8. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 - (Original Complaint by the European Communities) - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB (24 February 2004).
9. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Chile - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/CHL (31 August 2004).
10. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by the European Communities - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (31 August 2004).
11. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by India - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/IND (31 August 2004).
12. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Japan - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/JPN (31 August 2004).
13. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Korea - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/KOR (31 August 2004).
14. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Brazil - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (31 August 2004).
15. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Canada - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN (31 August 2004).
16. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Original Complaint by Mexico - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU - Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS234/ARB/MEX (31 August 2004).
17. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU - Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS285/ARB (21 December 2007).
18. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (31 August 2009).
19. WTO Arbitration Decision, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (31 August 2009).

WTO文件
1. GATT Panel Report, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII (Uruguay – Recourse to Article XXIII), L/1923, adopted 16 Nov. 1962, BISD 11S/95.
2. GATT, CONTRACTING PARTIES – Ninth Session – Report of Review Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions, L/327, 22 Feb. 1955
3. WTO, Dispute Settlement Body – Special Session, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23, 4 Nov. 2002.
4. Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/marrakesh_decl_e.htm
5. WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr05_e.htm

案件
Patton v. Mid-Continent System, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, (7th Cir. 1988).

網路資料
1. Chronological list of disputes cases http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm
2. Anti-dumping http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm
3. Comparative Advantage http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/cadv_e.htm
4. http://www.worldtradelaw.net
5. WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary of Article 22.6 Arbitration Decision, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under DSU Article 22.6, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/arb226/us-1916act(dsc)(22.6).pdf
6. Black's Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009, www.westlaw.com

條約文件
1. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Commentary (14) of Article 31, Article 51.
2. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945,1 UNTS XVI
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 1869 U.NT.S. 401
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947), 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
5. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
7. Agreement on Government Procurement, 1869 U.NT.S. 508 (Text available at 1915 U.N.T.S. 103).
8. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14

新聞
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