在〈論概念架構這個觀念〉這篇文章中，戴維森指出，在接受蒯因的建議放棄分析-綜合二元論以及還原主義這兩個教條之後，經驗主義仍然包含一個最基本的教條，他稱之為概念架構與經驗內容的二元論，「這是經驗主義的第三個教條，也許也是最後一個[教條]」（Davidson，1974，189）。他論證，根據這個二元論，我們無法對概念架構與經驗內容提出清楚的說明，同時也無法釐清這兩者間的關係，這是一個我們必須捨棄的教條，「倘若放棄了[這個教條]，經驗主義之所以被稱為經驗主義的那些特徵也不在了」（Davidson，1974，189）。
根據戴維森上述的主張，本文欲回答下列兩個問題：

（Q1） 概念架構與經驗內容的二元論是不是一個必須被捨棄的教條？

（Q2） 倘若放棄了概念架構與經驗內容的二元論，是否意謂著必須同時放棄經驗主義？

筆者將論證，（Q1）的答案是肯定的，而（Q2）的答案則是否定的。我認為，麥道的最小經驗主義可視為是不含此二元論之經驗主義的一個例子，換言之，一個捨棄了第三教條的經驗主義仍可以保留住它之為經驗主義的特徵。文末筆者將指出，戴維森提出經驗主義第三個教條必須被放棄的貢獻主要是在於，在戴維森之後，哲學家們開始在放棄概念架構與經驗內容的二元論這個基礎上，重新思索知識論上的問題，以不同以往的方式考量我們與世界的關係。

In “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Davidson urges that the dualism of scheme and content is the third dogma of empiricism, and if we give it up, it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism. Two issues are dealt with in this thesis:
(Q1) Is the dualism is a dogma that we have to abandon?

(Q2) If we do abandon this dualism, do we have to give up empiricism at the

same time?

I shall argue that the answer of (Q1) is affirmative and the one of (Q2) is negative. I think McDowell’s theory could be an example of empiricism without the third dogma. Davidson’s criticism of the dualism of scheme and content makes philosophers reconsider the problems in epistemology on a new base without the dualism.

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