我首先從交易成本期望值與變動量的區別，探討公司穩定性的涵義。接著我指出在時間過程中，為了在各種內外部因素的影響之下維持公司穩定性，公司在從事調整活動時必須克服各種交易成本的問題。為了比較不同組織方式的公司穩定性，我將公司穩定性定義為交易成本變動量。藉著這個定義，我證明在董事們的個人交易成本變動量差距比較小，以及股權比例比較集中的組織方式中，公司具有比較好的公司穩定性。最後我探討獨立董事對公司穩定性的影響。我發現如果不考慮其它條件，則獨立董事並不會特別有利於哪一種組織方式的公司穩定性。但在加入其它條件之後，我得出一個可以驗證的命題：在資訊與傳播科技進步的條件之下，在董事們的個人交易成本變動量差距比較大，以及股權比例比較分散的組織方式中，獨立董事對公司穩定性具有比較明顯的正面影響。

My intention is to explore the firm stability in corporate governance from the
perspective of transaction cost variability. First, I explore the implications of firm
stability by telling the divisions between the transaction cost expectation and
variability. Second, I indicate in the time process, in order to keep the firm stability
under the influences of external and internal factors, the firm engaging in adjusting
activities has to overcome various kinds of transaction costs. In order to compare the
firm stability of different organizations, I define the firm stability as the transaction
cost variability. Using this definition, I prove that the organization has a better firm
stability with smaller individual transaction cost variability differences between
directors and more concentrated stock holding proportions. Finally, I discuss the
influences of the independent director to the firm stability. I find that without specific
conditions, the independent director has no obvious influences to the firm stability in
different organizations. However, by adding a specific condition, I obtain a testable
proposition: under the condition of information and communication technology
progress, in the organization with broader individual transaction cost variability
differences between directors and more dispersed stock holding proportions, the
independent director has more positive influences to the firm stability.
Key Words: firm stability, transaction cost variability, corporate governance, board
of directors, independent directors

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