通常我們認為我們對外在世界有著經驗知識，根據傳統對知識的要求，這些知識是需要一些理由支持。但那些證成知識的理由，同樣也需要進一步理由支持，而進一步的理由又會需要更多的理由支持，如此一來就會導致證成的無限後退問題。在這個問題上，美國哲學家Laurence BonJour在早年是有名支持融貫論的知識論學者，但他卻在2003年所著的《Epistemic Justification》一書中明顯地轉變立場轉而支持基礎論。本篇論文將檢視BonJour對融貫論與外在論的批評，並且最終批判地討論BonJour於《Epistemic Justification》一書中所提出基礎論立場，是否能給予證成的後退問題一個好的回應。

According to the traditional analysis of knowledge, knowing that P requires being justified in believing that P. Since the justifier itself is required to be justified by another justifier whose justification needs further justifier and so on, this incurs the notorious problem of infinite regress of justification. BonJour, initially a representative defender of coherentism, claims that only foundationalism can solve the problem. The main purpose of this thesis is to examine (i) his criticisms of coherentism and externalism, and (ii) his arguments for his own version of foundationalism. I conclude that his critique of externalism in not well-founded and his foundationalism still cannot successfully solve the regress problem.

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