本篇論文主要探討在兩階段連續性投資模型中，加入代理人的資訊透露行為會如何影響委託人分別在分離組織(Separation,兩階段的計畫由兩不同代理人執行)的環境下以及具有分離以及合併組織(Integration,兩階段的計畫都由同一代理人執行)的環境下所訂定的最適契約。模型結果顯示：(1)在分離組織下，如果第一階段代理人的資訊透露成本很低或是第二階段代理人的努力(變動)成本很高，委託人傾向支付給第一階段代理人有誘因透露資訊給第二階段代理人的薪資；如果第一階段代理人的資訊透露成本很高或是第二階段代理人的努力(變動)成本很低，委託人越不願意支付給第一階段代理人有誘因透露資訊給第二階段代理人的薪資。(2)在分離組織與合併組織的最適契約比較下，由於委託人需支付給合併組織下的代理人的薪資會比支付給分離組織下的代理人的薪資總和低，因此委託人偏好合併組織下的最適契約。

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