研究生: |
范家彰 FAN, CHIA-CHANG |
---|---|
論文名稱: |
從法蘭克福特的意志學說觀點看笛卡爾第四沉思中的意志自由 On Descartes's Freedom of Will in the Fourth Meditation - from the Point of View of Frankfurt's Theory of Will |
指導教授: | 王榮麟 |
口試委員: | |
學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
系所名稱: |
人文社會學院 - 哲學研究所 Philosophy |
論文出版年: | 2009 |
畢業學年度: | 97 |
語文別: | 中文 |
論文頁數: | 70 |
中文關鍵詞: | 笛卡爾 、沉思錄 、錯誤 、意志 、自由 、意志必然性 |
相關次數: | 點閱:1 下載:0 |
分享至: |
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
論文摘要
這篇碩士論文處理的是笛卡爾在《沉思錄》一書中的第四沉思關於意志自由的問題,並且是從法蘭克福特提出的意志理論來探討。在第四沉思笛卡爾先說明他獨特的判斷理論,其中突顯出意志的角色,用來說明錯誤和全能不欺的上帝可以是相容的。而能證明任何我們所清晰明判知覺到的都為真,並且從這裡找到避免犯錯的方法做為之後沉思的指標。所以笛卡爾的意志自由論證的存在對第四沉思是重要的,對整個沉思錄也是必要的。本文主張可以由法蘭克福特的意志理論來補充笛卡爾意志自由論證的不足。
在結構上,本文將包含前面的導論和之後的四章,分別是:第一章,笛卡爾的第四沉思;第二章,笛卡爾的意志自由說在處理錯誤問題的優先性及限制;第三章,法蘭克福特的意志學說和其對笛卡爾第四沉思的支持;第四章,結論。由回顧文獻,笛卡爾的意志自由論證有下列的困難:1.笛卡爾如何說明意志是不受限制的,2.要怎樣說明意志自由的兩可的自由和自發的自由,而兩者彼此的關係是如何,3.自由意志論證無法說明為何全能的上帝不賦予人相當於人完美意志的完美理智,或使人只能自由地對清晰明判的知覺行使肯定的選擇,而令人不會犯錯。作者希望由法蘭克福特意志理論的特點׃法蘭克福特的意志階層理論,他主張:1.意志是主動的;2.意志預設了理智;3.意志是人形成自我的標誌;4.意志的不可分割性和意志的必然性是意志的構成性原則。我主張這正可以補足笛卡爾關於自由意志的說法,1.意志兩可的自由是意志做為人做決定的不能分割的能力的表現,2.意志的趨向於真和善的自發的自由就是法蘭克福特的決意的必然性,3.意志的兩可的自由和自發的自由就是意志的構成原則而不衝突,4.意志預設了理智,理智也依賴於意志。笛卡爾得以主張真誠不欺的上帝保證凡是清晰明判的知覺必為真,並進行下面的沉思。
參考文獻
Augustine (1984) On Free Choice of the Will, trans. A.S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, New York: Macmillan
Calvert, B. (1972) “Descartes and the Problem of Evil”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2: pp. 117-126.
Chappell, Vere (1994) “Descartes’s Compatibilism” In John Cottingham (Eds.), Reason, Will and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s Metaphysics, pp. 177-190, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cottingham, J. (1993) A Descartes Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell
-(1988) “Freedom and Morality” In The Rationalists, chapter 5, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
Cress, Donald A. (1994) “Truth, Error, and the Order of Reason: Descartes’s Puzzling Synopsis of the Fourth Meditation” In John Cottingham (Eds.), Reason, Will and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s Metaphysics, pp. 141-151, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davis, Richard (2001) “The Control of Credulity” In Descartes : Belief, Skepticism, and Virtue, chapter 4, pp. 78-102, New York : Routledge
Della Rocca, Michael (2006) “Judgment and Will” In Stephen Gaukroger (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations, pp. 142-160, Blackwell Publishing
Descartes, René (1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (vols. 1-2), ed. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dicker, G.(1993) Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
Flage, Daniel E. & Bonnen, Clarence A. (1999) “Meditation Four: Truth and Falsity: Reflections from the Summit” In Descartes and Method: A Search for a Method in Meditations, chapter 7, London and New York: Routledge
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII, no. 1
-(1982) “The Importance of What We Care About”, Synthese, vol. 53, no.2, pp. 257-72, D. Reidel Publishing Company
-(1969) “Alternate Possibility and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, LXVI, no. 23
-(1975) “Three Concepts of Free Action”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume
-(1977) “Identification and Externality” In Amelie Rorty(Eds.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press
-(1987) “Identification and Wholeheartedness” In Ferdinand David Schoeman (Eds.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, New York: Cambridge University Press
-(1998) “Rationality and the Unthinkable” In The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
-(1966) “Descartes’s Discussion of His Existence in the Second Meditation”, Philosophical Review 75
-(1989) “Concerning the Freedom and Limits of the Will”, Philosophical Topics 17
-(1992) “The Faintest Passion”, Necessity, Volition, and Love, pp. 95-107, Cambridge University Press
-(1993) “On the Necessity of Ideals” In G. C. Noam and T. Wren (Eds.), The Moral Self, pp. 16-27, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
-(1993) “Autonomy, Necessity and Love” In H. F. Fulda and R. –P. Horstmann (Eds.), Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, also in Necessity, Volition, and Love, 1999, Cambridge University Press
-(1999) “On Caring” In Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press
-(2008) Demons, dreamers, and madmen : the defense of reason in Descartes’s Meditations, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
-(2004) The Reasons of Love, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
-(2006) Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right, Stanford University Press
Hatfield, Gary (2002) “Judgment, Error, and Freedom” In Routledge philosophy guidebook to Descartes and The meditations, chapter 6, London and New York : Routledge
Janowski, Z. (2000) Cartesian Theodicy: Descartes’ Quest for Certitude, Dordrecht: Kluwer
Kenny, Anthony (1993) Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy, Bristol: Thoemmes Press
-(1972) “Descartes on the Will” In John Cottingham (Eds.), Descartes, pp. 132-159, Oxford University Press
Latzer, Michael J. (2001) “Descartes’s Theodicy of Error” In Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer (Eds.), The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy, pp. 35-48, University of Toronto Press.
Menn, S. (1998) Descartes and Augustine, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press
Newman, L. (1999) “The Fourth Meditation”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 559-591.
Petrik, James M. (1992) Descartes’ Theory of the Will, pp. 19-107, Durango, Colorado: Hollowbrook Publishing
Rosenthal, David M. (1986) “Will and the Theory of Judgment” In Rorty, A.O. (Eds.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, Berkeley : University of California Press;
Schouls, Peter (1994) “Human Nature, Reason, and Will in the Argument of : Descartes’s Meditation” In John Cottingham (Eds.), Reason, Will and Sensation: Studies in Descartes’s Metaphysics, pp. 159-176, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tierno, Joel Thomas (1997) Descartes on God and Human Error, pp. 1-99, New Jersey: Humanities Press
Wee, Cecilia (2006) “Falsehood, Error and Ethics” In Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Mediations, chapter 5, London and New York: Routledge
-(2007) “Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Williams, Bernard (1978) “Error and the Will” In Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, chapter 6, London and New York: Routledge
Williston, B. (1997) “Descartes on Love and/as Error”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 58: pp. 429-444.
Wilson, Catherine (2003) “Meditation Four (I) & (II) ” In Descartes’s Mediation: an Introduction, chapter 6 and 7, Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, Margaret Dauler (1978) “Judgment, Ideas and Thought” In Descartes, chapter 4, Routledge & Kegan Paul
李蕙蓉(2006)《論法蘭克福之意志階層理論》, 清華大學哲學研究所碩士論文