Issues related to communication are rarely discussed in property right framework. Who speaks first and if one can change ongoing topic, for examples, certainly involve right assignment. Organizational change must involve communication among the people. Taking a property right approach to communication, we can shed lights on the neglected bundling and unbundling of communication rights during organizational change. Drawing from a case study of medical center reform, we are able to give an account of communication rights change during the reform process. The paper finds that unbundling of communication rights began when the newly appointed CEO relinquished some of the communication rights usually associated with CEO. As a result of the CEO’s establishment of an open email box, employees were empowered to freely feedback their comments on and suggestions to his reform proposal. Re-bundling of communication rights evolved in the process as the CEO and employees continued to exchange their views on a more effective reform. The paper also explains the implication of communication rights reassignment to the success of an organizational change.

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