科學哲學的領域中，科學實在論和反實在論爭論不休。在這些爭論背後，關乎我們對不可觀察的理論存有物抱持著何種態度。按照科學中實事求是的精神而言，堅守「有幾分證據說幾分話」的經驗論主張更能符合科學的實踐作為。將此科學態度對照於科學實在論和反實在論，便能夠發現此兩種立場過猶不及的缺憾—面對經驗證據，科學實在論者宣稱過多，認為科學理論為真；反實在論者卻主張不足，不去承諾理論存有物存在。然而，實驗控制下的嚴格環境確實能提供可靠的證據，進而使我們承諾理論存有物存在。在天平兩端的立場之間，Hacking（1983）和Cartwright（1983）發展出作為中間立場的存有物實在論—一方面不須相信理論為真，一方面卻能證成理論存有物存在—試圖替這場爭論提供更好的選擇方案。

儘管如此，存有物實在論仍需要個中間基礎來支撐其立場的可信程度。為達成此目的，Hacking致力於探討實驗工作，從中提煉出支持存有物實在論的「實驗論證」；Cartwright在探討理論解釋和因果解釋的分野之際，萃取出用來證成理論存有物存在的「最有可能原因推論」（IMLC）。此兩種途徑確實有其深刻的洞見，卻仍有一些論證上的缺點。有鑒於此，後繼者分別提出方案予以補強修正，像是Suárez（2006）順應實驗論證的精神，進一步提出「知識論版本的實驗實在論」（EER）；Clarke（2001）則在IMLC的根基上，揭示出具有更穩固理據的IMLC*。本文企圖替存有物實在論辯護，在面臨必須因應批評者的攻擊，且要能獲致存有物實在論的結論的情況下，文中指出修改自EER的EER*和IMLC*兩者缺一不可，進而結合EER*和IMLC*作為中間基礎，用以支撐企圖成為可信立場的存有物實在論。

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