尼采思想的核心在於對人生的反思｡ 關於人生到底是什麼的問題﹐其之所以值得探問﹐是因為人們久久受制於一種自我欺騙之中｡ 本文首先交待﹐尼采在«人性﹐太過人性»一書中如何強調科學對人產生的影響｡ 讓人藉以認識自己﹐這就是尼采所看到的﹐科學作為人類最晚來的﹐然而卻是最豐富的成果﹐她的意義所在｡ 操守和知識﹐此二者是人類文化的結果｡ 然而﹐人類自大的傾向卻使人迷失於某種不合乎現實的想像之中﹕人把自己想得過高﹐他以為自己的生命是根本地不同於禽獸﹐從而以為藉由逐漸擺脫生命中比較接近禽獸的部分﹐使自己成為一位理想的道德人或者科學人﹐這樣﹐他便能夠得到｢進步｣｡ 可是﹐尼采相信﹐人類真正的進步卻在於人類開始對自己具有更為深刻的認識﹐更加明白關於生命的實際情況｡ 對於一位｢認識者｣﹐他知道只要自己一日還是處於生命之中﹐無論如何﹐他都不可能擺脫屬於生命的任何部分｡

按照尼采的看法﹐出於虛榮和無知﹐人類一度在精神以及行為方面為自己加諸了極大的束縛｡ 據此﹐為了獲得自由﹐人類必須成為認識者﹔換言之﹐他必須抹除從前由他所發明的使生命受到束縛的某種世界觀｡ 最終﹐我將指出﹕雖然該書的著眼點在於人類知識和虛榮的對立﹐但是﹐經由這種對立﹐尼采卻非以為人們應該站在某一面而否定另一面﹐而是要求人站在一個更高的知識層次之上﹐從而肯定生命裡頭的不同側面｡

Nietzsche's philosophy has its concern a reflection on the nature of life (Dasein). The nature of life becomes problematic since people has got used to a state of self-deception. What I am trying to do in this paper, first, is to follow the main theme of his book Human, All Too Human, and thus give an account of how Nietzsche see the influence of science on human being. As the latest but the most fruitful fruit of human being, Nietzsche thinks that science should carry a proper task: it can serve as a way through which we know ourselves. Morals and scientific knowledge, being but two results of human culture, due to human arrogance, have long been misunderstood. People have made themselves higher than they are and fundamentally different from the animals. Trying to free the more animal components from life, and then trying to convert themselves into some kind of moral man or scientific man, people think that they can thereby attain some kind of "progress". Nietzsche believes, however, that the genuine human progress lies rather in his deeper knowledge of himself and his clearer view of the actual situation of life. For a "knower", he should know that while one is living, one can never get rid of any part inherent in his life.

According to Nietzsche, people has been put in fetters – their behavior and their spirit have been badly restricted – but all due to their own vanity and ignorance. Therefore, in order to be free, one has to be a knower, i.e. he has to eradicate any world view (Weltbetrachtung) that has once led people to a fettered life. In conclusion, I will show that in spite of his opposition of knowledge to vanity in the book, Nietzsche does not really oppose to any one of which. What Nietzsche has pointed out, however, is a higher knowledge. With this kind of knowledge, people no longer deny any single aspect of life.

基本文獻
Nietzsche, F., Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA), hg. v. Giorgio Colli u. Mazzino Montinari, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag/Walter de Gruyter, 1999.
────, The Will to Power, tr. Kaufmann, W., Vintage Books, 1968.

參考譯本
Nietzsche, F., Human, all too human: a book for free spirits, tr. Hollingdale, R. J., 1986.
────, «悲劇的誕生﹕尼采美學文選»﹐周國平編譯﹐北嶽文藝出版社﹐2005｡
────, «不合時宜的沈思»﹐李秋零譯﹐華東師範大學出版社﹐2007｡
────, «朝霞»﹐田立年譯﹐華東師範大學出版社﹐2007｡

參考文獻
Deleuze, G., Nietzsche and Philosophy, tr. Tomlinson, H., Columbia University Press, 1983.
Kant, I., «純粹理性批判»﹐李秋零譯﹐中國人民大學出版社﹐2004｡
────, «歷史理性批判文集»﹐何兆武譯﹐商務印書館﹐2005｡
Plato, «柏拉圖對話集»﹐王太慶編譯﹐商務印書館﹐2007｡
Schopenhauer, A., «作為意志和表象的世界»﹐石沖白譯﹐商務印書館﹐2006｡
────, «倫理學的兩個基本問題»﹐任立､孟慶時譯﹐商務印書館﹐2004｡
────, «叔本華思想隨筆»﹐韋啟昌譯﹐上海人民出版社﹐2005｡
Weber, M., ‹學術作為一種志業›﹐錢永祥等譯﹐收於«學術與政治﹕韋伯選集I»﹐錢永祥編﹐遠流出版社﹐1991｡