台灣近年來金融機構問題頻傳,銀行經理人為求個人私利造成銀行經營的問題,甚至影響整體金融秩序。為探求上述問題,本研究利用Williamson(1999)的隨機撮合模型作延伸,藉由銀行所發行的銀行券,來探討銀行經理人授信貸放的行為是如何影響銀行的運作及金融脆弱性。
我們發現經理人會因為個人私利,而導致銀行運作所須訂定的放款利率在較低的水準。當社會上高風險投資計畫變多或投資計畫的失敗率上升,會增加金融脆弱性;而當社會上投資計畫的成本以及限制貸放給高風險投資計劃的比例上升時,同樣也會增加金融脆弱性。但是,若社會上低風險投資計畫或貨幣供給增加時,則會使金融脆弱性降低。

此外,在考慮銀行經理人行為對福利的影響時,若高風險和低風險失敗機率差距很大,而報酬卻相差不多時,經理人貸放給高風險投資者的比例愈低則福利愈高。反之,若當高風險和低風險失敗機率差距很小,而報酬相差很大時,貸放給高風險投資者的比例增加,福利反而上升。對於壞帳率高低的限制,我們可以發現若要追求較高的福利水準,並不是一昧追求太低的壞帳率,故本研究發現經理人追求個人私利行為所導致的壞帳率,

並非一定會對福利產生損害。

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