本論文要處理的是Keith Allen對於Alva Noë顏色知覺理論的批評。Allen給予Noë的顏色形上學理論一個現象面向的批評，另一方面給予顏色知覺理論一個知識論面向的批評。Noë的顏色知覺理論分為兩部分，其中顏色經驗理論的主張，簡單地說，是「除了接收到感官刺激之外，知覺者還必須擁有並運用感覺運動知識（sensorimotor knowledge）才能得到知覺經驗內容」。而Noë的顏色形上學理論，也就是現象客觀主義（phenomenal objectivism），主張顏色是物體和環境間的關係性質。Allen認為現象客觀主義無法說明「知覺呈現」（perceptual presence）現象。Allen也認為只使用辨識能力（discriminatory capacity）作為感覺運動知識是不足夠的，知覺者只依賴篩選與歸類的能力認識顏色會有困難。筆者認為這些批評是對於Noë理論的不完整理解所導致，在現象面向的批評中，Allen錯誤理解了現象客觀主義對於「實際顏色」（actual color）的定義，在知識論面向的批評中，Allen則是沒有注意到顏色知覺理論中感覺運動知識除了辨識能力以外還有「顏色空間」（color space）知識。因此，筆者認為這些攻擊並無法威脅到Noë的顏色知覺理論。

My aim in this MA thesis is, on the ground of enactive approach, to consider the objections proposed by Keith Allen to Alva Noë’s theory of color perception. Alva Noë proposed the enactive approach as a theory of perception, which includes an account of color experience and an ontology of color, called phenomenal objectivism. This approach argues that perception requires an implicit understanding of sensorimotor knowledge, and colors, on the other hand, are relational properties between objects and the environment. Keith Allen rejects this kind of account because he believes that phenomenal objectivism provides an account of color nature that would fail to explain the phenomenon of color perception, especially the phenomenon of perceptual presence and the required sensorimotor knowledge is complicated and too demanding for the normal people to have.
I believe that all the difficulties that Allen mentions can be resolved by examining the enactive approach more carefully: actual color as a sensorimotor profile can explain the phenomenon of perceptual presence, that is, color constancy, and sensorimotor knowledge is bodily skill that normal perceivers know how to exercise very well.
But there remains a problem: the enactive approach we currently have is not enough for answering the intuition behind those objections: a particular shade is somehow connected to an particular actual color. Therefore, I provide a thesis of “normal condition”to accommodate the intuition without compromising Noë’s enactive approach. This thesis goes well with the enactive approach and explains why an actual color is always named after a particular apparent color.
keywords: enactive approach, sensorimotor knowledge, color, perception, perceptual presence, color constancy.

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