本碩士論文旨在檢視羅蘭茲的複合心靈論。羅蘭茲首先藉由提出認知判準來回應反對者對該理論的批評，而這個認知判準是由四個條件組成。認知判準的第四個條件的目的是用以回應認知膨脹的問題。羅蘭茲宣稱可以用「整合」觀念以及人格與次人格層次的認知過程之區分來解決認知膨脹問題。羅蘭茲議論複合心靈論確實擴張了認知過程的範圍，但這樣的擴張只有在某些情況才會產生，並且是屬於良好的認知膨脹。筆者針對羅蘭茲的認知判準提出兩個反對意見，並且議論這兩個反對意見是嚴重的問題。筆者接續發展一套解決方案來回應這兩個反對意見，且以此方式強化了羅蘭茲的論述。但在認知膨脹的問題方面，筆者則議論有些複雜情況是羅蘭茲的回應無法恰當地處理，並且筆者議論羅蘭茲的認知判準需要更多的釐清和補充才能回應這些複雜情況。

In this master’s thesis I examine Mark Rowlands’ thesis of Amalgamated Mind. First of all, Rowlands defenses the thesis of Amalgamated Mind against many criticisms by offering a cognitive criterion with four conditions. The fourth condition of the cognitive criterion aims to answer the problem of cognitive bloat. Rowlands claims to solve the problem of cognitive bloat by means of the idea of “integration” and the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of cognitive processes. Rowlands argues that his thesis of Amalgamated Mind indeed expands the cognitive domain, but that this expansion is allowed only under certain conditions and is benign. I propose two objections to Rowlands’ cognitive criterion, and argue that these two objections are serious. But I then develop a way to answer these two objections and thereby reinforce Rowlands’ position. But with respect to the problem of cognitive bloat, I argue that there exist certain complicated situations involving cognitive bloat which Rowlands’ cognitive criterion cannot handle properly, and that his cognitive criterion thus needs more clarifications and supplements.

參考文獻

Blomberg, Olle.( 2011, Jan 25th). Review - The New Science of the Mind. Metapsychology Online Reviews . Retrieved April 16th, 2015, from http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=5907&cn=394.

Clark, A., and D. Chalmers. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58:7-19.

Marr, David. 2002. Selections from Vision. In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: selected readings in the philosophy of perception. MIT Press, 229-266.

Gibson, J.J. 2002. A theory of direct visual perception. In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: selected readings in the philosophy of perception. MIT Press, 77--89.

Menary, Richard. 2007. Cognitive Integration: Attacking the Bounds of Cognition. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rowlands, M.1999. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rowlands, M. 2001. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rowlands, M. 2003. Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. London: Acumen.

Rowlands, M. 2006. Body Language: Representation in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rowlands, M. 2010.The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied
Phenomenology. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Rupert, Robert D. 2011. Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (3).

Shapiro, L. 2011. Embodied Cognition. New York: Routledge.

Shapiro, L. 2014. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. New York:
Routledge.

Wheeler, M. 2005. Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.