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研究生: 陳潔心
Chen, Jie-Sin
論文名稱: 以 SVB 銀行倒閉事件探討央行的貨幣調控與監管
Exploring Central Bank's Monetary Regulation and Supervision through the SVB Bank Collapse Event
指導教授: 張焯然
Chang, Jow-Ran
口試委員: 陳政琦
蔡璧徽
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 科技管理學院 - 財務金融
Master Program of Finance and Banking
論文出版年: 2023
畢業學年度: 111
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 35
中文關鍵詞: 矽谷銀行美聯儲貨幣政策監管利率不動產抵押貸款證券負凸性存續期間
外文關鍵詞: Silicon Valley Bank, Federal Reserve, monetary policy, regulation, interest rates, Mortgage-Backed Securities, convexity, duration
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  • 本文從矽谷銀行 (Silicon Valley Bank,縮寫SVB) 倒閉事件,探討美聯儲的貨幣調控政策從寬鬆到緊縮,對個體經濟的實質影響。分析 SVB 的財務資訊及美聯儲對 SVB 銀行的監管文件。闡述了不動產抵押貸款證券 (Mortgage Backed Security, MBS),在美聯儲政策轉變下,從安全的資產轉變為致命的危機。本文亦比較美聯儲與 SVB 兩者同樣持有高比率不動產抵押貸款證券,在面對升息影響下卻有不同結果。最後討論美聯儲的貨幣政策依據及本事件中最大輸家即美國聯邦存款保險公司 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,縮寫FDIC) 成為 SVB 銀行倒閉事件中最後放款人。


    This paper explores the tangible effects of the Federal Reserve's regulatory monetary policy on the individual economy, focusing on the case of Silicon Valley Bank's (SVB) collapse. By analyzing SVB's financial information and regulatory documents of the Federal Reserve,It elucidates how Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), once considered safe assets, transformed into a fatal crisis under the Federal Reserve's policy shift. Furthermore, this paper compares the divergent outcomes faced by the Federal Reserve and SVB, both holding a significant proportion of high-ratio Mortgage-Backed Securities, amidst rising interest rates. Finally, the monetary policy rationale of the Federal Reserve is discussed and highlights the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the ultimate lender in the SVB bank failure.

    1.前言………………………………………………………………..1 2.文獻回顧…………………………………………………………..4 3.研究方法…………………………………………………………..6 4.實證結果………………………………………………………….27 5.結論……………………………………………………………….33 參考文獻……………………………………………………………..35

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    2.Federal Reserve. (n.d.), “Silicon Valley Bank: Review of supervisory materials. Retrieved from” https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/silicon-valley-bank-review-supervisory-materials.htm
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