台灣降水季節集中於夏季，冬季降水量低，水量在夏冬二季變化量大，在氣候變遷的影響下，降水更可能呈現集中於夏季，又因島形狹長、高山集中於中央，使河川多為荒溪型河川，使水資源儲存更加不易，在面臨時間與空間的雙重挑戰下，如何將水資源在得兼顧各級產業與生態環境之情況下進行妥善分配，是台灣水資源管理的重要議題。
台灣目前尚未有完整水資源交易機制，非乾旱期間雖可另行分配剩餘用水，卻因《水利法》規範水權停用兩年即喪失水權，導致水資源調度多以渠道借用費或建造物使用費等名詞進行規形成黑市，乾旱期間則僅能以農委會補貼停灌方式進行水資源移用，又《水利法》規範之水權標的僅有公共用水、農業用水、工業用水、水利用水與發電用水，並未設置環境用水標的，不僅未考慮環境的用水效益，亦無法有效率的進行水資源調配。
本研究參考他國水資源管理規範與台灣現況建構台灣水資源交易機制，並以經濟實驗對市場機制下非乾旱與乾旱期間，台灣現行水權標的與加入環境用水後之水移轉效益進行比較，並針對環境效益是否被納入計算，與公部門是否支持環境用水留存進行政策敏感度分析。

The precipitation in Taiwan is concentrated in summer, because the shape of island is narrow and mountain area are distributed on the central of island, not only does the amount of precipitation change greatly in the summer and winter , but also made fresh water storage getting harder.
According to the Water Act （2018）, a water right holder who fails to use the water for two years consecutively will lose his water right and have his water right deed revoked. Chiueh （2002） indicate that in the normal period, the water resources transaction mostly uses the terms such as canal borrowing fee or construction used fee to circumvent the water act, which is similar to the black market. In the dry period, the way of water transfer in Taiwan is that the government convene a meeting to coordinate the fallow. The Council of Agriculture will subsidizes the farmers according to the size of fallow, and transfer the agricultural water to the industrial sector to meet the demand. According to water act, the priorities of water usage are as follows supply for domestic use and public use, agricultural use, hydro-power, industrial use, navigation, and others. Therefore, we can know that the water act are not considering the benefit of environmental water used and basic flow, and the priorities of water usage are seems not be abide by law.
This study is going to take the water management experience in Australia, Colorado, and Chile as reference, designing economic experiments to find the benefit that entering environmental water usage under the market mechanism, and whether it might improve the benefit of water use during the normal and drought period in Taiwan. To establish Taiwan's water resources management system from perspective of mechanical efficiency. Under the influence of climate change, precipitation in Taiwan will getting more concentrated in summer and have less precipitation in winter （Chen et al., 2014）. How to make water resources distribution to meets the demand of industry and environment is an important challenge facing Taiwan.

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