意識問題是當代心靈哲學中心物問題的一個重要子題，許多堅持心物之間有不可跨越之鴻溝的學者，往往認為經驗帶有一種非物理的現象性質，也從而認定經驗不是或不僅僅是一種大腦現象。而學者Hopkins則認為，心物之間看似對立的直覺其實只是源於大腦之自我表徵所產生的一種錯覺。
Hopkins指出，在漫長的進化過程中，人類的大腦發展出兩套彼此相輔相成、並用以標示內部神經運作的表徵方式，分別是語句式表徵以及空間化表徵，而其中，由於空間化表徵是以外在知覺空間為模型、透過一種隱喻的方式來表徵大腦內部神經事件的因果效力，基於隱喻對應之不變性原則的運作，因此我們會很自然地認為引起我們行動的經驗事件並非物理事件，故而Hopkins強調，經驗看似帶有的現象性質其實只是在物理神經事件的運作下所產生的虛擬性質，且一旦我們認清大腦之自我表徵的運作，則意識問題便可迎刃而解。

在本論文中，我除了詳細地闡釋Hopkins的主要觀點及論證之外，另外將分別針對進化、隱喻表徵的運作與原則，以及經驗主觀性等主題進行個別的探討：首先，我們必須釐清空間化表徵與進化的關聯，指出為什麼我們需要這套表徵，而這套表徵又帶給人類什麼生存上的好處，因此，在第三章中，我以語句式表徵在進化上的優勢為基礎，進行一種類比式的思考，試圖分析空間化表徵所能提供的進化貢獻及獨特地位；其次，透過第四章，我將更深入地挖掘空間化表徵如何基於表徵神經事件的因果效力而讓我們在直覺上認定經驗帶有一些非物理的性質；最後，我在第五章中藉由分析各種可能的說法來更詳細地處理主觀性的問題，並試圖以我們複雜的感覺運動神經與知覺空間的互動來探討經驗的觀點面向如何形成，在此我認為我們在知覺空間中形成的視覺觀點可視為第一人稱內在觀點的基礎。而透過上述這些理論面向的深入分析，我試圖以這套空間化表徵理論來推進心物問題的解決。

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