本文採用 Holm(1997) 移轉定價(transfer pricing) 的基本模型，試分析一跨國廠商在面對Cournot 競爭、進口國法令趨於嚴格之下，其最適移轉定價行為之影響。
本文發現以下結果：第一，在不考慮利潤稅及關稅，廠商面對Cournot 競爭下，其最適移轉定價會低於邊際生產成本。第二，在線性模型假設下，最適的移轉訂價可使廠商原先之 Cournot 均衡移至 Stackelberg 均衡。第三，加入懲罰機制後或政府稽查態度趨於嚴格，皆使得廠商減少移轉定價價格之扭曲。第四，若廠商與政府的談判價格落在特定區間內，廠商則有意願簽署預先定價協議。

This thesis we extends the Holm(1997) framework to analysis how the application of APA in the host country impacts the multinational enterprise’s transfer pricing behavior. We find the following results. First, under Cournot competition, the optimal transfer price of the MNE could be lower than the marginal cost even in the presence of profit taxes and import tariffs. Second, in a linear demand model, we prove that the optimal transfer price would shift the MNE’s Cournot equilibrium to the Stackelberg leader position. Third, with the transfer pricing penalty scheme or if the government take a more severe attitude, we derive that the MNE would reduce the extent to which it distorts the transfer price. Fourth, we find that if the negotiated transfer price is in a specific range, the MNE would join the APA to secure higher total profits.

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