傳統的知識觀點認為，使真信念成為知識的要素是有助於為真的要素(如證據)，而有助於為真的要素是落在理論層面的範圍內，與實踐層面並不相關。對於這種知識不依賴於實踐事實的觀點，史丹利稱其為「理智主義」，而他在《知識與實踐利害》中的一項主要目的，便是要對這樣的觀點提出修正。史丹利注意到，依循理智主義觀點的脈絡主義所提出的案例，已經給予反理智主義成立的依據。為了讓這些案例能作為反理智主義的案例，史丹利一方面反對脈絡主義的主張不成立，另一方面給予這些案例一種反理智主義式---亦即他所主張的「與利害相關的不變主義」(IRI)---的解釋，IRI主張，某個人是否知道某個命題，有可能會部份地被關於主體所處環境的實踐事實所決定。

本文的目的，在於對史丹利的反理智主義論證進行探討，以期能給予史丹利是否成功達到其目的的一個初步評斷。從反對脈絡主義的部份來看，由於史丹利對脈絡主義的語義學主張提出了有力的批評，這迫使一些脈絡主義者為其論點提出了不同方式的辯護；從「主張與利害相關的不變主義」的部份來看，與利害相關的不變主義除了在論點的實行上有所困難之外，也面臨到一些知識論者提出的有力質疑。在綜合本文的討論之後，筆者認為，史丹利並沒有成功地達到反對理智主義的目的。

Traditional epistemologist supposes that the factors, which make a true belief to satisfy the condition of knowledge, are truth-conducive (ex. evidence). Truth-conducive factors are within the area of theoretical rationality, but they have no relation to practice. Stanley regards this kind of traditional epistemological view, i.e. the condition of knowledge does not depend upon practical facts, as “intellectualism”. In Knowledge and Practical Interests, he wants to modify this view of intellectualism. Stanley noticed that contextualists have showed some examples that suggest the condition of knowledge depends not only on truth-conducive factors but also on practical factors. Stanley points out that these examples raised by contextualists can already provide an argument against intellectualism. Nevertheless the thesis of contextualists is for Stanley not plausible enough. Therefore, Stanley claims an intellectualian interpretation – Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) – to make these examples plausible. IRI supposes that someone’s knowing of a statement is possibly partly determined by the practical facts of the subject's environment.

In my essay, I will examine the argument, which is raised by Stanley and regarded as anti-intellectualism, and see if Stanley has made it successfully. In view of anti-contextualism, Stanley's criticism is so strong that many of the contextualists are urgent to defend for their theses. With regard to IRI, Stanley also has to face with the weakness of his own arguments, which is strongly questioned by epistemologists. Finally, I conclude that Stanley doesn't succeed to defense his argument of anti-intellectualism.

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