在語言哲學史上，專名的所指對象如何被決定一事是個爭議已久的老問題。本文試著指出，過往一些對弗瑞格主義的攻擊大多立基在錯誤的基礎上︰一方面涉及對弗瑞格主義的詮釋，另一方面則涉及對專名的語意角色的誤解。

透過對命名儀式及命名傳播的分析，我指出專名實際上是回指指涉詞，並非本然的嚴格指稱詞，其嚴格性來自其回指對象︰知覺指示詞；專名的問題實際上是指示詞的問題。另一方面，藉著簡化弗瑞格式意涵為單純的呈現模式，我論証一個最小限度的弗瑞格主義將能躲過彌爾主義既有的攻擊，並且能妥善解決專名的指涉問題。

This thesis concerns the problem of reference fixing of proper names. Fregeanism was seen as a problematic approach in the past few decades, however, some of the critics were based on either inappropriate interpretation of Fregean sense or some misleading assumption on the semantic role of proper names.

In virtue of analyzing the use of proper names in grounding events, I point out that proper names are anaphoric devices. Proper names are indeed not rigid designator, but perceptual demonstratives, which proper names anaphorically refer to, are the genuine one; the problem of reference fixing is a derivative problem from demonstratives. On the other hand, I show that a minimal account of Fregeanism can both resolve the problem of reference fixing and circumvent the traditional critics by simplifying the concept of Fregean sense.

王文方(2011)。語言哲學。臺北市︰三民書局。
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